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CROSS-BORDER BANK BRANCHING UNDER THE
NAFTA: PUBLIC CHOICE AND THE LAW OF
CORPORATE GROUPS
Eric J. Gauvin*
I. INTRODUCTION

When representatives of the United States, Canada, and Mexico
signed the North American Free Trade Agreement 1 (NAFTA) in 1992,
they created the largest free trade zone in the world. 2 On items ranging
from automobile parts to water, from saw logs to beer, the negotiators
crafted a workable document that represented compromises by all parties,
but which was nevertheless minimally acceptable to all. As might be
expected, on the specific issue of trade in financial services the NAFT A
fashioned an acceptable, but incomplete compromise.
The promise of increased cross-border trade brings with it the need
for cross-border financial services. In 1988, the United States-Canada
Free Trade Agreement took the historic step of addressing trade in
financial services in addition to trade in merchandise, and the NAFT A
followed suit. 3 The willingness of the North American negotiators to
address issues of trade in services marked a significant departure from
typical trade negotiations where the focus is on the trade of goods rather
than the trade of services. 4

* Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law; B.A., Cornell University;
J.D., L.L.M, Boston University School of Law.
I. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 LL.M. 289.
2. See Linda Powers, NAFTA and the Regulation of Financial and Other Services, I U.S.-MEX.
L.J. 65,66 (1993) (noting that the NAFTA is a free trade area only, not a common market).
3. See WILLIAM R. WHITE, THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FTA AND NAFTA FOR CANADA AND
MEXICO 9 (1994) ('The FTA was a path-breaking agreement in that it explicitly treated the issue of
trade in financial services and accepted the principle of national treatment rather than reciprocity.");
see also Cally Jordan, Financial Services Under NAFTA: The View From Canada, 9 REV. OF
BANKING AND FIN. SERVICES, Mar. 24, 1993, at 45, 51 n.39 (noting that NAFTA marks the "first ever
principles-based approach to trade liberalization" in financial services, as opposed to the "a Ia carte
approach pursued under the FTA").
4. Of course, by the time the FTA and the NAFTA were negotiated, all of the North American
economies were solidly based on the provision of services rather than the trading of goods, so all the
257
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Drafting trade agreements that cover services is always difficult
because of issues such as defining what constitutes a service, figuring out
where it is performed, and finding equitable treatment for labor-intensive
as opposed to capital-intensive services.5 The challenge of drafting an
acceptable document covering trade in financial services in North America
was made even more daunting by the very different banking markets in the
three signatory countries. 6 The United States and Canada have solid, well
established banks and stable currencies, while Mexico's modem banking
industry is still in its infancy and the peso is somewhat volatile. Canada
and Mexico both have relatively concentrated banking markets in which
banking organizations are free to offer a broad range of financial services,
while the United States banking industry shares neither of those
attributes. 7
Despite these serious obstacles, the NAFrA negotiators were able to
agree on a framework for trade in financial services in the North American
free trade zone. Although the NAFrA potentially covers all providers of
financial services, this article focuses specifically on the banking industry.
The NAFI'A gives banks from each of the member nations access to the
banking markets of the other member nations. At present, U.S. access to
the Mexican and Canadian markets can be accomplished only through the
establishment of a new subsidiary. Of course, Mexican and Canadian
banks may also expand into the United States by establishing a de novo
bank or by acquiring an existing institution. In addition to these methods,
however, Mexican and Canadian banks are permitted to branch into the
United States, although like all foreign banks they are subject to an
extensive system of U.S. regulation as part of the price of expansion
through branching. In practice, the foreign branching regulations are so
onerous that it often makes more sense for foreign banks to establish a
countries recognized that they needed to address the issue. See Valerie J. McNevin, Policy
Implications of the NAFTAfor the Financial Services Industry, 5 CoLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
369, 377 n.37 (1994) (noting that services are the dominant U.S. export and that services account for
60% of Mexican GOP).
5. For a general discussion of the difficulty in negotiating agreements regarding trade in
services, see Jeffrey Simser, GATS and Financial Services: Redefining Borders, 3 BUFF. J.INT'L L. 33
( 1996) (relating some of the historic, economic and political forces that shaped the development of the
General Agreement on Trade in Services).
6. See Stephen Zamora, Comments on the Regulation of Financial and Legal Services in Mexico
Under NAFTA, 1 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 77 (1993) [hereinafter Zamora, Comments] (noting the disparities
between the U.S. and Mexican banking industries).
7. The United States market is served by thousands of banks and thrifts, and stands almost alone
among the Western countries in its division between commercial and investment banking. See
WILLIAM JACKSON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, GLASS-STEAGALL ACT!FJNANCIAL
MODERNIZATION ISSUES IN THE 105TH CONGRESS, CRS-16 (1997). In most countries, banking
organizations may engage in securities activities either directly through the bank itself, or, as in
Canada, through a securities affiliate in a holding company organization. See id.
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subsidiary rather than a branch_ 8 A question left open by the NAFfA,
therefore, is whether the banks of the member nations should be permitted
to expand across national borders through a true branch as opposed to a
subsidiary network or the currently burdensome u_s_ branching
9
regu 1atwns.
This article examines the issue of cross-border branching. It starts
with a brief overview of the banking markets and regulatory approaches in
the three countries, then it turns to a discussion of how the NAFfA
changed the regulatory landscape. It proceeds to examine the branching
question in light of the theoretical considerations of enterprise liability, the
moral hazard problem, and public choice. It concludes that in a perfect
world, a scheme of cross-border branching would be the preferred
approach to bank expansion in North America. However, in the real world
the banking regulators of the member countries will be reluctant to give up
any authority and the financial services providers in the member countries
will do what they can to preserve the non-tariff barriers to trade that
already exist, one of which is the restriction on branching. As a result,
nothing will change on the NAFfA branching issue until other
concessions, perhaps involving securities or insurance, tip the balance.
II. THE BANKING MARKETS AND APPROACHES TO REGULATION IN THE
NAFfA COUNTRIES
The three NAFfA countries have three very different banking
markets. These markets have been shaped by each country's unique
history and politics. The regulatory schemes of the three countries have
also molded the banking markets within their respective borders. This
section provides a brief summary of the banking markets and the
regulatory schemes in the three NAFfA countries.
A.

The United States

The banking market in the United States is unusual by international
standards. The two most distinctive features of the U.S. market are the
large number of financial institutions and the existence of barriers between
commercial and investment banking. To serve the twin goals of
promoting the development of a dispersed and locally-controlled banking
system while at the same time insulating the business of banking from
8. See infra text accompanying notes 128-35.
9 NAFTA, supra note I, art. 1403(1), 32 I.L.M. at 657 (stating that access to banking markets
should be through the choice of juridical form chosen by the investor); NAFTA, supra note I, art.
1403(3) (agreeing to review branching restrictions after the United States provides for nationwide
branching).

260

CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW

[Vol. 13:257

other commercial activities, the U.S. federal banking regulators have
focused a significant amount of energy on the regulation of bank holding
companies. 10 Bank holding companies evolved in the United States for a
number of reasons, but most importantly to overcome restrictions on
branching or interstate ownership of banks or as a way to circumvent
restrictions on permissible bank activities.ll I will discuss these two
aspects of the U.S. banking system in tum.
12
We have almost 12,000 banks and thrifts in this country -an
extraordinarily large number by comparison to other developed countries.
Recent consolidation in the banking industry notwithstanding, the United
States is not home to the world's largest banks and that is in part a choice
shaped by regulatory policy. There are many possible explanations for the
multitude of banks, such as the ongoing constitutional struggle between
the central government and the states, or the ingrained American distrust
of concentrated economic power. 13 These historical and political factors
certainly contributed to the most easily identifiable cause of having many
banks in the United States: prohibitions on bank branching. Until quite
recently, the United States had a patchwork quilt of branching schemes.
Some states essentially prohibited branching and instead required that
every banking location be a free standing, individually chartered and
capitalized bank. The goals of this approach, called "unit banking" were
two-fold: first, to lend stability to the banking system; and second, to
provide insulation to country banks from the potential state-wide
. . o f ctty
. b ank s. 14
donunatton
The unit banking idea, however, was relatively easy to circumvent.
By using a holding company, one banking organization could exercise
10. The hallmark of U.S. federal banking regulation is the Bank Holding Company Act (the
"BHCA"). See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1848 (1997).
II. See Robert Charles Clark, The Regulation of Financial Holding Companies, 92 HARv. L.
REV. 787, 816-17, 822-23 (1979) (noting that bank holding companies have been employed as a
means to achieve branching where states had restrictive branching laws, interstate ownership when
that was not permitted by law, and entry into businesses "closely related" to banking).
12. See General Accounting Office, Bank Oversight Structure: U.S. and Foreign Experience May
Offer Lessons for Modernizing U.S. Structure, 21 (1996) [hereinafter GAO Oversight Structure].
13. See PETERS. ROSE, BANKING ACROSS STATE LiNES: PuBLIC AND PRivATE CONSEQUENCES
1-2 ( 1997) (expressing the view that the regulatory scheme and the fear of concentrated economic
power combined to produce the atomized U.S. banking industry). By lucky coincidence, the fact that
banks do not dominate our national financial scheme may be at least partially responsible for the
strong securities markets and venture capital firms in the United States that permit new companies to
take root, prosper, and ultimately be sold off to the investing public. See Bernard S. Black and Ronald
J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J.
FIN. ECON. (forthcoming, 1998).
14. This scheme is referred to as "unit banking" and the two states most closely associated with
this approach were Texas and lllinois, but it once was the predominant approach to branching in the
United States. See JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION,
12-15 (2d ed. 1997).
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control over a large group of separately chartered institutions. 15 During the
Great Depression, states began to liberalize their branching statutes to
permit state banks to branch within the state, and federal law was amended
to give national banks the same branching privileges as state banks. 16 In
general, however, even as branching laws became more permissive, banks
were not permitted to branch across state lines. Even as interstate banking
began to take hold in the late 1970s and 1980s, the only method available
for banking organizations to enter a new state was to either form a de novo
bank in the state or to acquire an existing bank there. 17 Of course, banking
organizations that desired to engage in the business of banking in more
than one state could form holding companies to own separately chartered
institutions in different states. 18
Today, the branching picture is very different. On the state level,
virtually all states now permit state-wide branching. 19 On the interstate
level, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, 20
which went into effect on June 1, 1997, has essentially superseded the old
McFadden Act and Douglas Amendment provisions. The Riegle-Neallaw
permits nationwide interstate branching, thereby negating the requirement
that holding companies operating in several states have a bank chartered in
each of those states? 1 Therefore, in the current regulatory environment,
the holding company structure is much less important for the purposes of
overcoming branching and interstate banking restrictions? 2
15. See Clark, supra note 11, at 816-17 (noting that bank holding companies have been employed
as a means to achieve branching where states had restrictive branching laws).
16. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 14, at 23, 25-26. Under the McFadden Act, 12 U.S.C. §
36 (1988), national banks were permitted to branch only to the extent of state-chartered banks located
in their home state.
17. This was the result of the so-called Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act,
12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1988), which permitted interstate acquisitions only if expressly provided for in
the banking law of the target state. See ROSE, supra note 13, at 33-35.
18. See Clark, supra note II, at 18 (noting the use of the holding company device as a way to get
around interstate banking restrictions).
19. As of the end of 1994, there were no more unit banking states and only two states that did not
permit branching on a state-wide basis. See Dean F. Arne!, Trends in the Structure of Federally
Insured Depository Institutions, /984-94, Fed. Res. Bull. 3 (Jan. 1996).
20. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-328,
108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codified throughout Title 12 United States Code).
21. Only Texas and Montana have opted to delay implementation of the Riegle-Neal branching
provisions. Texas has delayed interstate branching until September 1999 and Montana has postponed
it until October 2001. See Bill McConnell, Interstate Starts Sunday; Impact Will Take Longer, AM.
BANKER, May 30, 1997, at 2 (noting the decision to delay in Texas and Montana).
22. Indeed, several banking organizations have already combined their numerous state-chartered
bank subsidiaries into one bank to take advantage of the benefits afforded by the Riegle-Neal law.
Many large banking firms have decided to consolidate all of their bank charters into one institution,
thereby in essence becoming single bank holding companies, or alternatively, shedding the holding
company structure altogether to operate as a bank with subsidiaries. See Brett Chase, As Milestone
Nears, Banks Prepare to Centralize, AM. BANKER, May 15, 1997, at 4. For example, Minneapolis
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The other great distinguishing feature of the U.S. banking system is
the scheme of product differentiation embodied in various state and
federal statutes, the most notorious of which is the so-called Glass
Steagall wall. 23 Although this law was designed to separate commercial
banking and investment banking, in the past few years observers of the
4
U.S. banking scene have witnessed significant erosion of that distinction?
While the role of the holding company as a component of geographic
expansion regulation is falling away, its role in the regulation of
permissible activities continues. The Bank Holding Company Act
reinforces the Glass Steagall act by erecting a barrier between a bank and
the other affiliates owned by the same corporate group. 25 Transactions
between members of the holding company group are subject to special
restrictions. 26 The goal of the "firewalls" constructed between the bank
and the other affiliates in the holding company is to insulate the bank
financially and operationally from the other activities being carried on in

based First Bank System, Inc. will combine most of its nine banks into one charter. See id. KeyCorp,
headquartered in Cleveland, will merge its twelve bank subsidiaries into one. See id. Other banks
taking advantage of consolidation include Wells Fargo & Co., BankAmerica Corp., and First Union
Corp. of Charlotte. See id.
23. The "Glass-Steagall wall" essentially consists of four key provisions, referred to by the
section numbers the provisions had in the original Glass-Steagall Act, namely §§ 16, 20, 21 and 32.
Section 16 limits the involvement of national banks and state banks that are members of the Federal
Reserve System in the "dealing of stock and securities," and prohibits them from purchasing securities
for their own account (except those approved by the Comptroller of the Currency), and from
underwriting any issue of securities or stock. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988 & Supp. 1996). Section 20
prohibits the affiliation of any member of the Federal Reserve System with any business "engaged
principally" in the issuance, floatation, underwriting, public sale or distribution of securities. 12
U.S.C. § 377 (1988). Section 21 is essentially the mirror image of§ 16, prohibiting persons "engaged
in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling or distributing securities" from engaging in the
"business of receiving deposits ...." 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1)(1988). Section 32 prohibits persons
"engaged in the business of issuing, floating, underwriting, selling or distributing securities from
serving as officers, directors or employees of Federal Reserve System member banks." 12 U.S.C. § 78
(1988).
24. See generally THE NEW BUSINESS OF BANKING: WHAT BANKS CAN Do NOW (Julie L.
Williams, et a!. eds, 1996) (giving an in-depth description of the various securities and insurance
powers permitted to commercial banks).
25. See Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst. (ICI
430 U.S. 46,
71 (1981) (stating that one of the purposes of the Bank Holding Company Act was to sever the
connection between bank holding companies and affiliates principally engaged in securities activities).
26. Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 37lc to c-1 (1994), impose
significant restrictions on transactions among affiliates within a holding company organization.
Section 23A restricts transactions such as loans or extensions of credit, purchase of securities or other
assets, and the issuance of various kinds of accommodation between a bank and an affiliate unless they
meet certain quantitative and qualitative limits. !d. Section 23B extends the restrictions in 23A by
prohibiting certain transactions outright and subjecting additional transactions to a test that they be on
terms comparable to those that would obtain in an arm's length transaction. See MACEY & MILLER,
supra note 14, at 398-401.

m.
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the holding company organization?7 By providing that insulation, the law
aims to avoid the "subtle hazards" and conflicts of interest that may arise
when one organization controls a bank and other businesses that might be
tempted to exploit the banks resources. 28
Yet even with the restrictions contained in the BHCA, U.S.
commercial banks already participate in a range of businesses outside of
the traditional lending and deposit-taking activities that constitute the core
of the commercial banking business. By statute, bank holding companies
are allowed to participate in activities "closely related" to banking
provided those activities produce public benefits.29 The Federal Reserve
Board has promulgated Regulation Y to specify that "closely related"
activities include such things as acting as investment advisor to mutual
funds, leasing property, providing data processing services, providing
courier services, performing real estate appraisals, providing investment
advice on financial futures and options, and providing tax preparation
services. 30 Bank holding companies are now permitted, among other
things, to provide discount brokerage services, 31 and to underwrite (on a
limited basis) mortgage-backed securities, 32 municipal revenue bonds,33
and corporate securities. 34 Recently, the Federal Reserve Board has
loosened the restrictions between banks and their securities affiliates

27. See ROBERT A. EISENBEIS, Commentary, in RESTRUCTURING BANKING AND FINANCIAL
SERVICES IN AMERICA 203, 206 (WilliamS. Haraf & Rose Marie Kushmeider eds. 1988) (describing
the two types of insulation).
28. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971). Possible subtle hazards that have
been identified in the scholarly treatment of the subject include: the potential for biased advice to
clients designed to benefit the holding company's non-banking operations; uneconomical transfers,
such as bank loans to troubled holding company subsidiaries; bank trust department securities
transactions designed to bolster the offerings of an investment bank affiliate; predatory practices and
collusion between the bank and other affiliates designed to injure other competitors of the affiliates;
and the possibility of tying arrangements by which bank services and products would only be available
in conjunction with the purchase of affiliates' products and services, perhaps at an above-market price.
See Daniel R. Fischel et al., The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. REV.
323-30 (1987) (discussing the "subtle hazards" suggested by the Camp decision); see also James R.
Smoot, Striking Camp and Moving to Higher Ground: The Hazardous Subtleties of "Subtle Hazards"
in Bank Regulation, 4 GEO. MASON L. REv. I, 38-40 (1995) (discussing "subtle hazards" in light of
the Camp decision and the history of the Glass-Steagall Act).
29. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1996).
30. 12 C.F.R. § 225.25 (1996).
31. See Securities Industry Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(Schwab), 468 U.S. 207 (1984); 12 C.F.R. § 225.125(h) (1997).
32. See Citibank, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473 (1987), aff'd sub nom. Securities Industry Ass'n v.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988).
33. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47 (2d
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988).
34. See J.P. Morgan, 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 192, 195 (1989).
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within the holding company structure?5 In addition, the Federal Reserve
has completely overhauled Regulation Y, the regulation that covers bank
holding companies, with an eye toward loosening existing restrictions and
adding new activities to the list of those approved as being "closely related
to banking."36
Seeking to go further than the Federal Reserve, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency recently blessed the use of operating
subsidiaries for national banks,37 thereby making the holding company
structure less important as a way to get around restrictions on bank
activities. 38 In light of these revolutionary changes, there is talk in
Washington of abandoning the traditional product market distinctions
altogether and developing the idea of "Financial Institution Holding
Companies."39
If recent experiences with banking reform are any guide, the success
of the new proposals will depend in significant part on how well they
balance the interests of the myriad state and federal regulators that have a

35. See Review of Restrictions on Director and Employee Interlocks, Cross-Marketing Activities
and Purchase and Sale of Financial Assets, 61 Fed. Reg. 57,679 (1996) (easing or eliminating: (I) the
prohibition on personnel interlocks between a bank and a securities affiliate of a bank holding
company; (2) the restrictions on joint marketing activities between a bank and a securities affiliate; and
(3) the restrictions on the purchase and sale of financial assets between a bank and a securities
affiliate.); Revenue Limit on Bank-Ineligible Activities of Subsidiaries of Bank Holding Companies
Engaged in Underwriting and Dealing in Securities, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,750 (1996) (increasing from 10%
to 25% the amount of total revenue that a nonbank subsidiary of a bank holding company may derive
from underwriting and dealing in securities that the bank is prohibited from dealing in).
36· Melanie L. Fein, Fed's Proposed Overhaul of Regulation Y Goes Far, But Could Be Bolder,
15 BANKING PoL'Y. REP. 4 (Oct. 21, 1996) (describing the proposed changes to Regulation Y). The
Fed's initiative seems to be influencing the expansion plans of players in the banking industry. See
With Rules Eased, Banks Flock to Securities Underwriting, AM. BANKER, Aug. 18. 1997, at I (noting
the acquisition of securities firms by large banks and the strategic changes in regional banks' plans).
37. See 61 Fed. Reg. 60,342 to 60,387 (1996). The Comptroller of the Currency has promulgated
a regulation that permits national banks to form operating subsidiaries that may engage in several new
activities, such as equipment leasing, insurance, real estate brokerage, real estate development, and
securities underwriting. See id. Given that most states have parity or "wild card" statutes which by
law grant their state-chartered institutions powers at least as liberal as the powers given to national
banks, see CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS,. A PROFILE OF STATE CHARTERED BANKING
156-58 (1996), the extent of liberalized banking powers in the banking system as a whole is quite
extensive.
38· See McConnell, supra note 21 (noting that some banks plan to convert to a national charter,
establish operating subsidiaries, and shed their holding company structure).
39. As of this writing, the House of Representatives appeared to be making progress on a
financial services modernization bill that accommodates all the necessary parties. See Jeffrey Taylor,
House Is Close to Deal on Leveling Walls Among Banks, Securities Firms, Insurers, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 5, 1998, at A2. It is unlikely that the House bill will be considered by the Senate in this session.
See id. Earlier in the 105th Congress, the Financial Services Competitiveness Act of 1997, H.R. 10,
105th Cong. (1997), the Depository Institutions and Thrift Charter Conversion Act, H.R. 268, 105th
Cong. (1997), and the Depository Affiliation Act, H.R. 669 & S. 298, 105th Cong. (1997) were all
proposals that would have restructured the regulation of banking to permit closer affiliations between
banks and securities firms.
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stake in the financial services market. At the federal level there are four
important bank regulators, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC), and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). 40 In
addition to the federal banking regulators, every state has a state-level
banking regulator as well. In the securities industry, the picture is similar.
Federal regulation is primarily the responsibility of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), but each state has a securities regulator to
carry out the state "blue sky" law. In insurance, there is no federal
regulation, just state level insurance regulators.
From a political
perspective, the changing role of bank holding companies raises
interesting turf battles among the major federal banking regulators. 41
Because the Federal Reserve Board is charged with supervision of bank
holding companies while the OCC, OTS, and FDIC are focused on
banking institutions, the Federal Reserve Board feels quite threatened by
the declining importance of the holding company structure. The regulatory
competition picture is more complicated, however. Because the banking
regulatory adjustments are being made at the same time changes to Glass
Steagall are under consideration, the turf battles will necessarily include
the various state and federal regulators who have some involvement in the
securities and insurance industries. The political melee may come to
resemble the war of all against all.
B.

Canada

Canada's banking industry presents a radical contrast to the U.S.
banking scene. All banks are federally chartered and fall into one of two
categories: "Schedule I" or "Schedule II" banks. 42 So-called Schedule I
banks are subject to the "widely-held" rule: no person or group may
control more than ten percent of the voting stock of a Schedule I bank. 43
Instead of the thousands of independent banks found in the United States,
Canada is dominated by six large Schedule I institutions with nationwide

40. To this list some would add the Treasury Department generally. See GAO Oversight
Structure, supra note 12, at 27.
41. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition versus Consolidation: The Significance of
Organizational Structure in Financial and Securities Regulation, 50 BUS. LAw. 447, 447-48 (1995)
(chronicling the turf wars that erupt whenever serious proposals to reform U.S. banking law are
advanced).
42 See Bank Act, R.S.C., ch. B-1.01, § 14 (1996) (Can.); see also Jordan, supra note 3, at 46
(noting that when a bank is chartered in Canada, the bank's name must be added to either Schedule I
or Schedule II of the Bank Act).
43. See Bank Act, R.S.C., ch. B-1.01, § 370(2) (1996) (Can.) (defining "widely held").
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branching networks. 44 Schedule II banks, on the other hand, may be
closely held and owned by non-Canadians. 45
In addition, unlike American banks but similar to their Mexican
counterparts, Canadian banking organizations are not constrained by the
artificial product line distinctions found in the Glass-Steagall Act. Under
present Canadian law, banks, insurance companies, and securities firms
are permitted to own one another and to provide services to the public
through separate subsidiaries in a holding company structure. 46 While the
separate subsidiary requirement provides some financial insulation for the
bank, the operational insulation required by U.S. law is lacking.
The lines of command in the Canadian bank regulatory scheme are
much clearer than in the American regulatory system. In Canada, a
federal banking supervising agency whose head is appointed by the
cabinet and who reports directly to the Minister of Finance, is the chief
banking regulator. 47 The federal supervisor is responsible for all federally
chartered financial institutions including banks, insurance companies and
trust companies, while sharing responsibility with the provinces for
oversight of securities firms. 48 The Canadian federal deposit insurer plays
a secondary role in bank oversight, while the Bank of Canada maintains
data on the financial system generally and on banks individually.49
Another big difference between U.S. banks and their Canadian
competitors is the weight of the regulatory burden shouldered by each.
Although it is an imprecise measure, the differing volume of banking
legislation in the two countries speaks to the difference in regulatory
attitudes. In the early 1990s, U.S. federal banking laws and regulations
totaled approximately 220,000 pages, while in Canada the entire Bank Act
and associated regulations amounted to no more than 530 pages. 50 This
might not be surprising in light of the deep concern in U.S. banking policy

44. These six institutions are the Bank of Montreal, Bank of Nova Scotia, Canadian Imperial
Bank of Commerce, National Bank of Canada, Royal Bank of Canada, and Toronto Dominion Bank.
See James R. Kraus, Canadian Government's Fears of Concentration Seen Threat to Megadeal, AM.
BANKER, Feb. 12, 1998, at 20.
45. See Jordan, supra note 3, at 48 (observing that virtually all Schedule II banks are foreign
controlled bank subsidiaries).
46. See id. at 50 (noting the "Canadian model" of universal banking as securities and banking
activities being conducted through a parent-subsidiary structure).
47. See GAO Oversight Structure, supra note 12, at 57.
48. See id. at 62.
49. See id. at 57.
50. See John C. Pattison, Trade in Financial Services In NAFTA: A Public Choice Approach, in
REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE NAFTA COUNTRIES AND
BEYOND 145, 148-49 (George M. von Furstenberg ed., 1997).
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over branching and activities, both of which are not important issues in
Canada. 5 1
C.

Mexico

The Mexican banking system is perhaps best described as a work in
progress. Years of political and economic turmoil in Mexico from its
colonial past, through the tumultuous nineteenth century, and into the
present time have stacked the odds against a stable banking system.52
Throughout its history, Mexico has been dependent on foreign capital for
economic development. Perhaps in an effort to reclaim Mexico from
foreign influence, the Mexican Constitution of 1917 established
substantial restrictions on foreign investment in Mexico, basically setting
aside such major industries as petroleum, railways, and electricity for
either the Mexican government or Mexican nationals. 53
Although the constitution and subsequent foreign investment laws did
not set aside banking as a Mexican-only activity, as a practical matter the
banking industry in Mexico was concentrated in the hands of a few
powerful families. 54 In 1973, Mexico passed the Law for the Promotion of
Mexican Investment and the Regulation of Foreign Investment (FIL),
which contained a provision essentially requiring all economic enterprises
doing business in Mexico to have 51% Mexican ownership. 55
During the oil boom of the 1970s, Mexico incurred a huge foreign
debt. When oil prices slid and interest rates rose in the early 1980s,
Mexico's public and private borrowers were unable to make their
payments. 56 In a surprise move, on September 1, 1982, Mexico

51. Another explanation for the difference is the willingness of Canada's banks to adopt
voluntary guidelines in order to prevent the need for legislated solutions to perceived problems. See
GAO Oversight Structure, supra note 12, at 72 (noting the voluntary adoption by Canadian banks of
consumer and small business lending guidelines to prevent legislative solutions).
52. Mexico won its independence from Spain in 1821, after three centuries of Spanish
exploitation that did little to establish an independent economy in Mexico. See Carlos M. Naida, Note,
NAFTA, Foreign Investment, and The Mexican Banking System, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON.
379, 380-81 (1992). In the 1800s Mexico resisted an invasion from Spain, two invasions from France
and significant border battles and outright war with the United States. See id.
53. See Jorge Camil, Mexico's 1989 Foreign Investment Regulations: The Cornerstone of a New
Economic Model, 12 Hous. J. lNT' L L. I, 6 (1989).
54. See Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., Expropriation and Aftermath: The Prospects of Foreign Enterprise
in the Mexico of Miguel de Ia Madrid, 18 TEx. lNT'L L.J. 431, 440-41 ( 1983).
55. See Naida, supra note 52, at 382-83.
56. See Bronwen Davis, Comment, Mexico's Commercial Banking Industry: Can Mexico's
Recently Privatized Banks Compete With the United States Banking Industry After Enactment of the
North American Free Trade Agreement?, 10 ARIZ. J. OF INT'L & COMP. L. 77, 78-79 (1993) (noting
the boom and bust cycle).
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nationalized the banking system. 57 Over the next eight years, the Mexican
government made significant economic reforms and reduced state
ownership of industries and state control of banking. Beginning in 1990,
Mexico reprivatized the eighteen state controlled banks, finishing the
process in 1992 with a generous profit for the Mexican government. 58
After reprivatization, Mexican banks grew at a furious rate. 59 Most
banks were owned by financial groups dominated by securities firms with
high risk tolerances. Bank managers likely felt pressure to recover the
rich premiums paid to acquire the banks. 60 Consequently, loan quality
dropped while loan growth soared. Once the bubble-nature of the bank
growth became clear, however, banks significantly increased their loan
loss reserves. 61 The devaluation of the peso in late 1994, together with the
credit quality problem, sent Mexico's banks into crisis. In response to the
crisis, international and Mexican banking concerns took action that
stabilized the Mexican banking system. 62 The repercussions of the 1994
crisis are still being felt, although Mexican banks have shown a revival
and demand for peso-denominated loans has been increasing. 63
At the time of the NAFfA's negotiation, Mexico's banking market
was dominated by six large nationwide institutions, with seven smaller
regional banks playing a secondary role. 64 Mexican banks may branch
anywhere in the country. Banks may be owned by financial groups that

57. See John P. Cogan, Jr., Privatization of the Mexican Banking System: Quetzalcoatl and the
Bankers, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 753,754 (1992 ).
58. See Davis, supra note 56, at 87-89 (chronicling the privatization process and noting that the
Mexican government earned $12.9 billion on the sale of the banks).
59. See Roy A Karaoglan & Mike Lubrano, Mexico's Banks After the December 1994
Devaluation-A Chronology of the Government's Response, 16 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 24, 25-26
(1995) (reporting that during the period 1991-94 assets of Mexican banks grew 111.3% in nominal
terms, and 64.6% in real terms, equal to a real annual growth rate of 18.1%).
60. See Stephen L. Auckiger, The Mexican Banking Crisis: Remedies and Opponunities, 50
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. 76 (1996) (reporting the dominance of the securities firms and pressure on bank
management).
61. See Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 59, at 27.
62. See generally Javier Gavito et al., Mexico's Banking Crisis: Origins, Consequences and
Countermeasures, in REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF FiNANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE NAFfA
CoUNTRIES AND BEYOND (George M. von Furstenberg ed., 1997) (providing a detailed history of the
peso crisis and the response thereto); Leslie M. Norwood, Note, International Banking-U.S. Banks
Operating Abroad, 15 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 169, 173-174 (1996) (describing the peso devaluation
and the subsequent international intervention to address it); Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 59
(describing the government's response to the peso devaluation); see also Auckiger, supra note 60
(outlining the regulatory changes brought about by the crisis).
63. See Craig Torres, Mexico's Banking System Is Having A Revival-Loan Demand Rises
Among Businesses, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1998, at Al2.
64. See Naida, supra note 52, at 388 (noting the existence of six national and seven multi-regional
banks).
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own other financial services firms such as securities and insurance
.
65
compames.
Mexico's banks and securities firms are regulated by Mexico's central
bank, the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit and the primary regulator,
the National Banking and Securities Commission (CNBV). 66 The states of
Mexico do not play an active role in the regulation of financial
institutions.
III. HOW THE NAFT A CHANGED THE LANDSCAPE
In many ways it seems that the NAFT A banking provisions have been
much ado about nothing. Despite the exaggerated claims, both positive
and negative, that accompanied the passage of the NAFTA, 67 the empirical
data since the passage of the Agreement suggests that the North American
financial services market is not radically different. 68
The NAFT A was intended to give the member nations broad access to
each other's markets. The banking provisions of the NAFTA are based in
large part on the banking provisions of United States-Canada Free Trade
Agreement (FT A). 69 The foundational ideas of both treaties are national
treatmenC 0 and most favored nation status. 71 As between the United
States and Canada, the NAFT A added little to the existing relationship
memorialized in the FT A, but it did add important provisions framing the
relationship of the two countries with the Mexican banking system. What

65. See Ramon Bravo, Mexican Legal Framework Applicable to Operations Involving Financial
Services, 25 ST. MARY's L.J. 1239, 1243 (1994) (reporting that Mexican financial groups may consist
of general deposit warehouses, financial lessors, factoring companies, limited scope financial entities,
exchange houses, bonding companies, insurance companies, brokerage firms and banks).
66. See Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 59, at 28-29 (describing the Mexican bank regulatory
system).
67. See McNevin, supra note 4, at 382 (noting the "exaggerated and extravagant expectations
regarding the possible negative and positive effects of the NAFfA").
68. See Daniel E. Nolle, Integration and Globalization of the Canadian and U.S. Banking
Industries: A Modest Role for NAFTA? in REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF FiNANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS IN THEN AFfA COUNTRIES AND BEYOND I 59, 160-64 (George M. von Furstenberg ed.,
1997) (showing that there has been no significant change in the amount of U.S. banking activity in
Canada or Canadian banking activity in the U.S. since the passage of the NAFfA).
69. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M. 281. In fact,
several provisions of the FTA were incorporated into the NAFfA by reference. See NAFfA, supra
note I, art. 1401(4), annex 1401.4.
70. See NAFfA, supra note I, arts. 1405, 1406. In a nutshell, national treatment means that the
people and companies of one country will be treated in the same way and be subject only to the same
restrictions as citizens or companies of the host country. See Kenneth L. Bachman et a!., Financial
Services Under the North American Free Trade Agreement: An Overview, 28 lNT'L LAw. 291, 294
(1994).
71. See NAFfA, supra note I, art. 1406(1). Most favored nation status insures that where the
host country confers favorable treatment to a non-NAFfA country, the NAFfA member countries will
also receive the same favorable treatment. See Bachman eta!., supra note 70, at 295.
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follows is a summary of the changes the NAFTA brought about within the
confines of the existing banking regimes in the three signatory countries.
A.

The United States

Under the NAFTA, Canada and Mexico's access to the United States
banking market did not change in any material way. The United States
already extended national treatment to all foreign banking organizations
doing business in the United States. 72 Before the treaty both Canadian and
Mexican banks had access to the U.S. market on terms similar to those
available to all other countries. Under the FfA, however, the United
States granted Canada a concession under the Glass-Steagall act to treat
Canadian government securities as "bank eligible" securities. 73 Under the
NAFT A, however, the United States did not extend that same treatment to
Mexican government securities?4
On the other hand, Mexican financial holding companies that, as of
January 1, 1992, owned a Mexican bank with U.S. operations and also
owned a Mexican securities firm that owned or controlled a U.S. securities
firm were grand-fathered to offer both brokerage and banking in the
United States for five years without being a violation of Glass-Steagall. 75
Otherwise, Mexican banks entering the U.S. market are treated as any
other foreign bank doing business in the United States.
B.

Canada

Under the FfA, U.S. banks gained preferential access to the Canadian
banking market. Although the FfA did not make any meaningful changes
in the access of Canadian banks to the U.S. market/6 it did provide U.S.
banks with rights not shared by non-Canadian banks generally. In effect,
it provided national treatment in Canada for U.S. banks that were
established there. As a result of the FfA changes, U.S. banks were no
longer subject to the foreign ownership restrictions of the Bank Act. 77 The
72. Although national treatment is the official view, the United States has sometimes articulated a
policy of reciprocal national treatment. See Eric Palace, International Banking-Foreign Banks
Operating in the United States, 14 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 154, 164 (1995).
73. See U.S.-Canada Free Trade Act, supra note 69, art. 1702.
74. See Bachman et al., supra note 70, at 311.
75. See id. at 311-12 (noting that the NAFTA grandfathers some Mexican firms that already had
both banking and securities operations prior to the enactment of the NAFTA).
76. In fairness, by comparison to the Canadian banking market, the U.S. banking market was
already quite open to foreign bank participation. For instance, as of 1995, banks owned by foreign
countries controlled 20.8% of the total assets in the United States banking system, as opposed to just
7.8% of the assets in the Canadian banking system. See Nolle, supra note 68, at 162.
77. Those restrictions were formerly found at Bank Act, R.S.C., ch. B-1.01, § 399(1) (Can.), but
were repealed by Ann. Stat. Can., 1994, ch. 47, § 20.

CROSS-BORDER BANK BRANCHING UNDER THE NAFFA

1999]

271

Bank Act now makes special provision for "NAFfA country residents." 78
The policy of national treatment as embodied in the NAFfA also
liberalized the treatment of U.S.-owned Schedule II banks. Specifically,
U.S. Schedule II banks are permitted to branch across Canada in the same
streamlined fashion that Canadian banks may. 79
Canada has not, however, become the 51st state. For many purposes,
U.S. and Mexican banks are still foreign banks. For example, they may
not branch directly into Canada, but may operate in Canada only through a
Canadian-chartered Schedule II subsidiary. 8 Canadian bank regulators
apparently insisted on requiring a Canadian-chartered subsidiary in order
to ensure that Canadian law would apply. 81
Relating to Canada-Mexico relations, the NAFfA extended to
Mexico the same treatment that Canada extended to the United States
under the FfA. Most importantly, Mexican residents qualify for the
special treatment afforded to "NAFfA country residents" under the Bank
Act. 82 Therefore, the same benefits accorded to U.S.-controlled Canadian
banks will apply to Mexican controlled Canadian banks as well.

°

C.

Mexico

Prior to the NAFfA, Mexico's banking market essentially was closed
to American banks. 83 The NAFfA changed that by permitting U.S. and
Canadian banks to establish wholly-owned banking subsidiaries in
Mexico. 84 Given the relative weakness of Mexico's banking system
compared to its two imposing northern neighbors, however, Mexico
negotiated for some protections in the NAFfA to prevent foreign
domination of the Mexican banking industry. Specifically, Mexico set out
aggregate capital limits for foreign subsidiaries. 85 In the wake of the 1994

78. Bank Act, R.S.C., ch. B-1.01, § 11.1 (Can.).
79. See Bank Act, R.S.C., ch. B-1.01, § 422.2 (Can.).
80. Canada may soon consider legislation that would permit cross-border branching. See Joseph
Weber, Just Over the Horizon: North American Banks, A Few Rule Changes would Bring a Wave of
Cross-Border Mergers, Bus. WK., Feb. 23, 1998, at 100 (noting the expectation that the Chretien
government will introduce branching legislation).
81. See Jordan, supra note 3, at 48 (explaining that Canadian regulators continued to insist on
foreign banks employing a Schedule II subsidiary in Canada in order to be assured they would have a
Canadian entity to regulate).
82. Bank Act, R.S.C., ch. B-1.01, § 11.1 (Can.).
83. See Norwood, supra note 62, at 174.
84. See Palace, supra note 72, at 161-62.
85. When foreign banking was first permitted in 1994, foreign subsidiaries' aggregate capital
share of the Mexican domestic market was limited to 8%. The Mexican plan called for an increasingly
liberal scheme of foreign ownership over a six year transition period until in the last year if the
transition foreign banks could control an aggregate of 15% of the capital in the commercial banking
market. NAFfA, supra note I, Annex VII(B)(9), 32 I.L.M. at 774. At the end of the transition period
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peso crisis, Mexico modified, but did not abandon, its foreign ownership
rules to permit greater foreign influence in the banking system. 86
After the transition period, U.S. and Canadian institutions will be
permitted to acquire outright existing Mexican banks, subject to the
limitation that the sum of the capital of the acquired bank and any affiliate
of the foreign acquirer not exceed four percent of the aggregate capital of
all commercial banks in Mexico. 87 Barring unforeseen circumstances, this
restriction will prevent the unfriendly acquisition of Mexico's six largest
banks since they all exceed the capital limit. 88
IV. CROSS-BORDER BRANCHING: PUBLIC POLICY AND LEGAL THEORY

International banking is now a fact of life. Some U.S. banking
organizations now report that a majority of their productive assets are
located abroad. 89 As the North American market for goods and services
becomes more integrated, there will be increasing pressure on the NAFT A
countries to rationalize cross-border banking. Under the terms of the
NAFTA, the time is now at hand to re-examine the issue of cross-border
branching. Section 1403(3) of the NAFTA states:
at such time as the United States permits commercial banks of
another Party located in its territory to expand through
subsidiaries or direct branches into substantially all of the United
States market, the parties shall review and assess market access
provided by each party ... with a view to adopting arrangements
permitting investors of another Party to choose the juridical form
of establishment of commercial banks. 90
Section 1403(1) stipulates that investors of a Party should be free to
establish financial institutions in the other countries "in the juridical form
chosen by such investor."91 The import of that provision is that banks
the aggregate capital limits will lapse subject only to Mexico's reserved right to impose additional
limitations on banking competition if foreign banks control 25% of the Mexican banking market
before January 1, 2004. See Bravo, supra note 65, at 1249-51 (setting out the restrictions on foreign
ownership of various Mexican financial institutions).
86. See Auckiger, supra note 60, at 79 (describing changes in Mexican law that expand but do
not eliminate the NAFfA foreign ownership limits).
87. See NAFfA, supra note 1, Annex VII(B)(3), 32 I.L.M. at 775.
88. See Naida, supra note 52, at 407.
89. See William H. Lash, ill, The Decline of the Nation State in International Trade and
Investment, 18 CARDOZO L. REv. lOll, 1017 (1996) (citing the fact that Bankers Trust reports that
52% of its productive assets are offshore, while Citicorp reports 51% of its assets fall into that
category).
90. NAFfA, supra note I,§ 1403(3), 321.L.M. at 657.
91. NAFfA, supra note 1, § 1403(1), 321.L.M. at 657.
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should be able to expand across borders by establishing either branches or
subsidiaries as dictated by their business plan rather than by banking law.
Of course, branching is not the only way to cross borders. There are
several ways in which banks located in one country may gain access to
foreign markets. Using one approach instead of another may in part
depend on whether the bank wants to do business "with" the foreign
country as opposed to "in" the foreign country. In general, it is easier to
do business with a foreign country because the legal requirements are
relatively modest. Doing business in a foreign country frequently requires
complying with more onerous licensing and regulatory obligations. 92 Of
course, the distinction sometimes is not clear. 93 With that in mind, there
are four major alternatives for foreign banks to deliver financial services
across national borders.
A.

Methods of Engaging in Cross-Border Banking

1.

Subsidiaries

All three NAFrA countries permit banks from the other NAFrA
countries to expand into their territory by establishing separately chartered
subsidiaries in the host country. The subsidiary must comply with all
licensing and regulatory requirements, including capital requirements.
The subsidiary approach to expansion suffers from several weaknesses.
The costs of establishing a subsidiary can be considerable. A free
standing bank must have a complete internal infrastructure, capital base
and management team. In addition, subsidiaries are limited somewhat in
their lending capacity, since loan limits are typically a function of the
amount of the bank's capital. The problem of a low lending limit can
often be avoided through the use of loan participation agreements.
Perhaps owing to the expense of establishing and operating subsidiaries, it
appears that subsidiaries are less attractive than branches. 94
On the other hand, if subsidiaries are respected as legal persons
separate and distinct from their corporate parents, they may be an effective

92. See Guillermo Marrero, What Foreigners Should Know About the Mexican Market, in
PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, NAFTA: WHAT You NEED TO KNOW Now 119, 125 (PLI Comm. Law
& Practice Course Handbook Series No. 669, 1994) (describing the distinction between doing business
with and doing business in Mexico).
93. See id. (noting that, in Mexico, a business will be considered doing business in the country if
it regularly or continuously executes commercial transactions there).
94. See Hal S. Scott, Supervision of International Banking Post-BCCI, 8 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 487,
491 (1992) ("The competitive superiority of branches is reflected in the fact that of the $800 billion
total of foreign bank assets in the United States, $626 billion is in branches and agencies of foreign
banks--only $174 billion is in subsidiaries.").

274

CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW

[Vol. 13:257

method for insulating the parent from liabilities ansmg out of the
subsidiary's banking activities. 95 Indeed, the limitation of the parent's
liability is frequently the most important reason for forming subsidiaries. 96
Of course, limited liability is a central tenet of modem corporation law.
Professor Blumberg has summarized the various advantages of limited
liability in the corporate context as: permitting absentee investors to avoid
exposure to risk; permitting large-scale enterprise; permitting diversifica
tion of portfolios; avoiding increased agency costs; avoiding impairment
of the efficient capital market; avoiding increased collection costs for
creditors; avoiding the costs of contracting around liability, and the
encouragement of risk-taking. 97 Professor Blumberg also has concluded,
however, that many of the traditional theoretical factors justifying limited
liability for corporations become irrelevant in the context of subsidiary
corporations; 98 and may as a matter of public policy be outweighed by the
disadvantages of limited liability including: unfairness and inefficiency for
tort and other involuntary creditors; unfairness and inefficiency for labor
claimants; the encouragement of excessive risk taking; increased
information and monitoring costs; impairment of the efficiency of the
market; and the possibility of misrepresentation. 99 Others have argued that
the limited liability aspect of the subsidiary is economically inefficient and
therefore undesirable. 100
Nevertheless, in modem practice, corporations form subsidiaries for
any number of reasons, including, in addition to the desire to limit
liability, the need to comply with regulatory ownership requirements, a
desire to establish certain procedural benefits, such as venue and jurisdic

95. The idea of subsidiaries as independent legal persons is tied up in nineteenth century ideas
about corporate personality. There have been several excellent treatments of corporate theory that
examine the evolution of the idea of the corporation from a concession granted by the sovereign to an
artificial person to a natural person to an aggregate of contractual interests. For general background on
this topic, see Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88
W.VA. L. REV 173 (1985); HERBERT HOVENCAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, at
12 (1991); JAMES W. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1780-1970, at 4 ( 1970); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J.
201 (1990); and Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations,
15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 283 (1990).
96. See CHESTER ROHLICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES §
I 0.02 (5th ed. 1975).
97. See PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: SUBSTANTIVE LAw 66-86
(1987); see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 40-62 ( 1991 ).
98. See BLUMBERG, supra note 97, § 5.01.
99. See id.; see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 97.
100. Joseph H. Sommer, The Subsidiary: Doctrine Without a Cause?, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 227,
231-42 (1990).
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tion, 101 or in the case of banking in the NAFfA countries because present
law does not permit cross-border branching. Regardless of the reasons for
the use of subsidiaries, it may be said that despite their separate legal
existence they form a cohesive economic unit with their parent and related
corporations.
In the banking context, the ability of the parent to avoid or deflect
liability through the use of a banking subsidiary gives rise to an especially
pernicious moral hazard problem. 102 Holding companies might not run a
subsidiary bank as prudently as they otherwise might because the risk of
loss is limited to the capital invested in the subsidiary and not backed by
the full faith and credit of the parent. In the United States, the moral
hazard problem in the bank holding company/bank subsidiary context has
resulted in an ongoing effort by regulators to invent new and better ways
of imposing liability on holding companies for the failure of bank
subsidiaries. Federal banking regulators have devised a host of legal tech
niques designed to impose liability on bank holding companies in the
event of bank failure. 103

101. See ROHLICH, supra note 96 (citing various legal reasons for subsidiary formation such as to
limit liability, to avoid restrictions in the parent's charter or restrictions arising under law, for tax
reasons and for purposes of avoiding complications arising from "foreign corporation" status; also
citing non-legal reasons such as increasing the morale of the subsidiary's management, to settle
shareholder disputes and public relations purposes); LARRY A. SODERQUIST & A.A. SOMMER, JR.,
UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 238-41 (1990) (citing use of subsidiaries in corporate acquisi
tions); Sommer, supra note 100, at 259-73 (citing use as an effective method for controlling choice of
law and venue).
102. See Eric J. Gouvin, Shareholder Enforced Market Discipline: How Much is Too Much?, 16
ANN. REV. BANKING L. 311, 312-17 (1997) [hereinafter Gouvin, Market Discipline] (providing a
general overview of the moral hazard problem in the banking context). Of course, the moral hazard
problem is not unique to the bank holding company situation. In fact, "moral hazard" may be present
in any number of situations from products liability and workers' compensation to bankruptcy and
health care. The idea of moral hazard is present in any situation where the existence of some kind of
insurance or cost-shifting is perceived to reduce the incentives to reduce or minimize loss. See Tom
Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 238 (1996) (providing a history of
the term "moral hazard" and criticizing its use in the debate over the reform of various government
programs on the ground that the conditions necessary to give the concept force in economic theory do
not exist in the real world). In general, a moral hazard results whenever one actor or class of actors in
a transaction can undertake risky behavior without fear of loss because the loss from the risky activity
falls on a different actor or group of actors by contract or other arrangement. See RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 150 (3rd ed. 1986). Moral hazards are present in all
transactions in which an actor may be shielded from liability by insurance or by limited liability
business forms. See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the
Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 103-04 (1985). All corporations entail some moral risk, for
example, because the limited liability form always presents opportunities to shift losses from the
equity holders to creditors and other claimants. See id.
103. These regulatory mechanisms include, among other things: the so-called source of strength
doctrine, 12 C.F.R. §225.4(a) (1996), cross guarantee provisions, 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e) (Supp. 1994),
capital restoration plans, 12 U.S.C. § 183lo(e)(2)(C)(ii) (1996), regulatory agreements, the elaboration
of a general fiduciary duty to regulators, equitable subordination, preferences, and fraudulent
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The most powerful tool currently available to U.S. banking regulators
to indirectly shift the costs of bank failure to holding companies is the
cross-guarantee device contained in the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA). 104 The cross
guarantee provisions allow the receiver of a failed insured bank to make
claims against other commonly controlled insured depositary institutions
for the loss that the receiver incurs or anticipates that it will incur in
disposing of or assisting the failed institution. 105 This approach will not be
useful in the international context because it only applies to insured
depositary institutions. Assuming the cross guarantee provisions are not
effective in the international context, and also assuming banking regula
tors will still seek to protect the deposit insurance fund by looking for
other parties to share the pain of bank failure, we may find the Federal
Reserve Board resurrecting the "source of strength" doctrine.
Under the source of strength doctrine, bank holding companies are
required to assist bank subsidiaries in difficult financial times by providing
financial assistance to them. 106 Although the validity of the source of
strength is an open question, 107 the Federal Reserve Board continues to
employ the source of strength idea in its decisions. 108 A return to the
source of strength doctrine could mean that bank holding companies will
essentially become unlimitedly liable for the losses that may occur when
an insured bank fails. Obtaining these payments from foreign bank
holding companies will also be problematic. Establishing the source of
strength may be something that the Federal Reserve Board will seek to do
through contractual arrangement at the time the foreign banking
organization seeks to establish its U.S. operations, or perhaps through
aggressive use of the "prompt corrective action" provisions of U.S. law. 109
conveyances. See Gouvin, Market Discipline, supra note 102, at 333-45 (describing the various
regulatory methods in light of a pervasive scheme to impose liability on holding companies).
104. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in various sections of 12 U.S.C. and 27
U.S.C.). The cross guarantee provisions are codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1815(e) (West Supp. 1996).
105. See id.
106. See Policy Statement; Responsibility of Bank Holding Companies to Act as Sources of
Strength to Their Subsidiary Banks, Federal Reserve System, 52 Fed. Reg. 15,707 (1987).
I 07. For a brief discussion of the evolution of the source of strength doctrine and its current status,
see Gouvin, Market Discipline, supra note 102, at 333-36; Leonard Bierman & Donald R. Fraser, The
"Source of Strength" Doctrine: Formulating the Future of America's Financial Markets, 12 ANN.
REV. BANKING L. 269 (1993).
108. See, e.g., Deutsche Bank AG, 79 Fed. Res. Bull. 133, 137 (1993); Bane One Corp., 78 Fed.
Res. Bull. !59, 161 (1992).
·
109. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA), Pub. L. No.
102-242, 105 Stat. 2236, commonly referred to as FDICIA (codified as various sections of 12 U.S.C.),
requires institutions defined as "undercapitalized" to submit a Capital Restoration Plan to the
institution's federal banking agency. 12 U.S.C.A. § 183lo(e)(2)(D)(I)-(ii) (West Supp. 1996). If a
bank holding company controls the financial institution, FDICIA prohibits the banking agency from
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Under the prompt corrective action provisions, a troubled institution
must submit a capital restoration plan to its regulator. If a troubled
financial institution fails to submit a capital restoration plan or to
implement a plan that has been submitted and approved, the regulators
have a number of sanctions at their disposal, including the power to seize
the institution_llo It should be noted, however, that no provision of U.S.
banking law expressly requires a holding company to guarantee
compliance with a subsidiary's Capital Restoration Plan. 1 ll The optional
aspect of these plans may have been designed to facilitate early resolution
of the insured institutions by requiring the holding company to either
make a financial commitment to the subsidiary's continued survival, or,
alternatively to decline such a commitment and in doing so indicate to the
regulators that the holding company is willing to let the subsidiary fail. 112
Although the moral hazard problem is a serious public policy problem
that should be addressed with innovative countermeasures, I have argued
elsewhere that the current regulatory scheme goes too far in imposing
liability on bank holding companies for bank failure, resulting in negative
consequences. 113 I believe the move toward increased liability for bank
holding companies is misplaced, and should be reassessed in order to give
more respect to the separate legal existence of well capitalized banks and
the holding companies that own them. Nevertheless, there are times when
a holding company should bear some responsibility for the failure of its
subsidiary. 114 The subsidiary arrangement makes the imposition of that
liability somewhat problematic.
2.

Branching

In general, from the point of view of the parent banking organization,
branching should be more economically attractive than setting up an
independent subsidiary since capital, accounting, and legal costs can be

approving the Capital Restoration Plan unless the holding company guarantees compliance with the
CRP for one year and provides adequate assurances of compliance. 12 U.S.C.A. §
183lo(e)(2)(C)(ii)(D (West Supp. 1996).
110. See 12 U.S.C. § 183lo(g)(3) (1994).
Ill. See Cassandra Jones Havard, Back to the Parent: Holding Company Liability for Subsidiary

Banks-A Discussion of the Net Wonh Maintenance Agreement, The Source of Strength Doctrine, and
the Prompt Corrective Action Provision, 16 CARDOZO L. REv. 2353, 2388 (1995).
112. See Richard Scott Carnell, A Panial Antidote to Perverse Incentives: The FDIC Improvement
Act of 1991, 12 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 317, 339 (1993).
113. See Gouvin, Market Discipline, supra note 102, at 345-354.
114. See Eric J. Gouvin, Horizontal Conflicts and Bank Holding Company Liability, 51-78 (Nov.
12, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing that holding companies should be
liable to third parties for bank failure only to the extent the directors of the subsidiary owed a duty to
non-shareholders (including the bank as an entity) and failed to carry out those duties).
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shared more easily. 115 In the United States, operations would be more
easily integrated because the prohibitions of §§23A and 23B will not
apply to transactions between branches, but they would restrict
transactions between commonly controlled subsidiaries. 116 In addition,
loans generated by a branch can be made based on the capital of the home
bank in the home country instead of on the branch's capital. On the other
hand, liabilities of the branch will likely be imposed on the home office
more readily than the obligations of a separately organized subsidiary
would be. 117 Although local regulators are likely to have less control over
a branch because the regulator in the home country will have primary
responsibility, the branch is likely to be more stable because of the greater
worldwide capital of the bank. 118
3.

Other Ways of Accessing Foreign Markets

Another way to do business with a foreign country is through a
"representative office" which does not solicit loans or take deposits, but
which acts as a liaison to make it easier for potential borrowers or
depositors in the host country to transact business with the foreign bank in
the bank's home country. 119 In addition to these three common
approaches, the United States permits banking activities to be carried out
through "agencies" chartered by a state or the federal government, which
are in effect special purpose banks. 120
Finally, for some financial service providers, such as cash managers,
mortgage servicers and data processors, it would appear that many aspects
of international business may be undertaken from home. It seems likely
that some aspects of the Mexican market, for instance, can be exploited

115. See Zamora, Comments, supra note 6, at 79 (noting economies achieved through branching).
116. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (describing§§ 23A and 23B).
117. See Wells Fargo Asia, Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 936 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505
U.S. 1204 (1992) (holding that absent a contractual restriction on the place of collection, a customer of
a foreign branch may recover from the bank's horne U.S. office the amount of the obligation). The
risk of foreign sovereign actions that make meeting obligations impossible was addressed somewhat
by amendments in 1994 to the Federal Reserve Act and the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, which
changed the law to hold the horne U.S. offices liable for such obligations only if agreed in writing.
See Palace, supra note 72, at !69 (describing the amendments).
118. See Scott, supra note 94, at 491 (noting that local deposits of branch are backed by home
office capital).
119. See HAL S. SCOIT & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACfiONS,
POLICY, AND REGULATION 135 (4th ed. 1997). When Mexico was closed to foreign bank ownership,
foreign banks were nevertheless permitted to maintain representative offices in the country. See
Ghislain Gouraige, Jr., Recent Development, 24 HARv.INT'L L.J. 212,214 n.l9 (1983) (noting that at
the time Mexico nationalized the Mexican banks there were over I 00 representative offices of foreign
banks in Mexico).
120. See Scorr & WELLONS, supra note 119, at 135.
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from the United States without a physical presence in Mexico.
Although for some companies, these alternative methods will make the
most sense, this article focuses on the choice of subsidiaries as opposed to
branches.
On the question of whether subsidiaries or branches are preferable
from a public policy point of view, corporate law would offer two possible
insights: first, in order to avoid the moral hazard problem branches are
preferable to subsidiaries because it is clearer that the home bank should
be responsible for the branch's obligations; or, second, international
banking law should permit both methods of expansion in order to let
corporate planners exercise their own judgment about which form makes
the most sense for a particular bank in a particular situation. 122
B.

Problems of Cross-Border Regulation

Regulation is an inescapable fact of modem banking. Cross-border
regulation, however, is awkward. Both the home and host countries have
legitimate claims to full and accurate information on banks operating in or
from their jurisdiction, 123 and both regulators have a legitimate concern to
124
In an
prevent the threat of systemic risk brought about by bank failure.
ideal world, bank regulators in different countries would be comfortable if
they knew that a fellow regulator in another country was supervising the
other aspects of an international bank's operations by applying rigorous
standards. Such an ideal scheme would require at least two preconditions:
(I) regulators would have to agree on acceptable standards that would pass
international muster, and (2) regulators would have to have confidence in
the competence and integrity of the regulators in other countries.
Unfortunately, the NAFT A countries do not meet these conditions. It will

121. Of course, large loans to major borrowers and government units can be arranged that way, but
perhaps consumer banking services like credit cards can be offered in Mexico but serviced in the
United States. See Karen MacAllister, Note, NAFTA: How the Banks in the United States and Mexico
Will Respond, 17 Hous. J. INT'L L. 273, 295 (1994) (suggesting that credit cards, ATM networks and
residential mortgages may be lucrative and easily penetrated market for U.S. banks desiring to do
business with Mexico).
122. This is the approach adopted by the NAFTA. NAFTA, supra note I, art. 1403(1}, 32 I.L.M.
at 657 (recognizing the principle that investors should be able to choose the juridical form to use for
cross-border banking).
123. The lesson from the LDC debt crisis seems to be that more information is always preferable.
See William A. Lovett, Conflicts in American Banking Regulation: Renewed Prudence, Retrenchment,
and Struggles Over Growth Potential, 12 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 44, 49 (1993) (noting that there
should be enforceable mutual disclosure laws so unsustainable debt loads do not get out of hand
again).
124. See generally Mico Loretan, Systemic Risk in Banking: Concept and Models, in REGULATION
AND SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE NAFTA COUNTRIES AND BEYOND 37, 38-42
(George M. von Furstenberg ed., 1997) (discussing the concept of systemic risk generally).
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be extraordinarily difficult for trade negotiators to make agreements about
cross-border branching without also making a commitment to harmonize
North American banking law. For example, the United States would
legitimately want to know whether the source of strength doctrine would
allow the Federal Reserve Board to pursue the holding companies of
Mexican and Canadian banks operating in this country. Canada and
Mexico would legitimately want to know whether Glass-Steagall will
prohibit their banks from operating freely in the United States while also
being part of an organization that owns a securities company. But the
NAFfA does not contain any meaningful commitment to harmonization
of the banking regulatory schemes of the three countries. 125
On the second point, it is not at all clear that the regulators in the three
countries have the mutual respect necessary for a successful cooperative
regulation effort. For example, Canadians resent what they consider to be
the propensity of U.S. regulators to seek extraterritorial application of U.S.
law. 126 During the negotiation of the FfA and the NAFTA, it was
understood that a significant part of Canada's opposition to cross-border
branching was based on Canadian banking regulators' desire that there be
a Canadian bank doing business in the country that they could regulate. 127
Similarly, there was some concern in the United States that the Mexican
banking regulators were not up to the task of supervising a modern
banking system.
Given the lack of harmonization and the lack of mutual respect, it was
inevitable that the NAFfA banking structure would default to a system
requiring subsidiaries instead of one that permitted branching. Therefore,
under current law, all three NAFfA countries permit expansion by
establishment of subsidiaries, but only the United States permits foreign
banks, including Canadian and Mexican banks, 128 to expand into our
125. See Joel P. Trachtman, Trade in Financial Services Under GATS, NAFTA and the EC: A
Regulatory Jurisdiction Analysis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37, 94 (1995) (noting that the
NAFfA does not require financial regulation harmonization). But see Stephen Zamora, NAFTA and
the Hamwniwtion of Domestic Legal Systems: The Side Effects of Free Trade, 12 ARIZ. J. OF INT'L &
COMP. L. 401 (1995) [hereinafter Zamora, Harmonization] (arguing that increased cross-border
contact between businesspeople, bureaucrats, lawyers, academics and others will inevitably lead to an
exchange of ideas and accommodation in each of the three countries of the cultural differences of the
others); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., A Global Perspective on Current Regulatory Reforms: Rejection,
Relocation, or Reinvention?, 2 GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. J. 429 (1995) (arguing that global political and
economic forces push national policies towards various forms of deregulation and privatization).
126. See Jordan, supra note 3, at 48 (noting that "Canadian regulators do not indulge in the
extraterritorial application of Canadian banking laws").
127. See id. (voicing the opinion that the Canadian trade negotiators did not yield to the pressures
to permit U.S. branches because "Canadian regulators ... wished to ensure that there was a Canadian
entity to be regulated.").
128. In fact, branches are the most important mechanism for giving Canadian and Mexican banks
access to the U.S. market. See Michael G. Martinson, Consolitklted Supervision of Cross-Border
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market through branching. 129 The fact that the U.S. law permits
branching, however, is not the end of the story. Foreign banks seeking to
establish a presence in the United States must comply with a labyrinth of
federal regulations which seem to treat foreign banks less favorably than
U.S. banks. 130 The Foreign Bank Supervision Act of 1991 tightened U.S.
supervision of foreign branches and agencies operating in the United
States. 131 The law provides for increased sharing of information between
home and host country regulators; mandates deposit insurance for all
deposits under $1 00,000; requires the Federal Reserve to approve all
applications for any branch, agency or representative office; and permits
the Federal Reserve Board to examine and close all such international
banking facilities. 132
One of the most significant aspects of the new regulation is that
foreign banks must decide if they intend to engage in wholesale or retail
banking through their branches. If they plan to engage in retail banking,
in which they will take deposits of less than $100,000, then the U.S.
operation must be set up as an insured subsidiary rather than as a branch of
the foreign bank. 133 The comprehensive supervision and information
requirements of the law have dampened foreign interest in the U.S.
banking market. 134 The increasingly difficult process of branching into the
United States may explain the provision in the NAFT A that imposes a
freeze on any further restrictions on cross-border banking. 135
From a regulator's point of view, in a modern world where one
banking organization might act across the country and around the world
through dozens of wholly owned subsidiaries, the fiction of separate
corporate personality for each subsidiary in a corporate group does not
reflect reality. Because in the real world there is little practical difference
Banking Activities: Principles and Practice in the NAFTA Context, in REGULATION AND SUPERVISION
OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE NAFI'A COUNTRIES AND BEYOND 217, 225 (George M. von
Furstenberg ed., 1997).
129. Canada may soon propose legislation that would permit cross-border branching. See Weber,
supra note 80.
130. See Charles W. Hultman, Foreign Banks and the U.S. Regulatory Environment, 114 BANKING
L.J. 452 (1997) (noting that the Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991 resulted in less
favorable treatment for foreign banks).
131. See generally Daniel B. Gail et al., The Foreign Bank Supervision Act of /99/: "Expanding
the Umbrella of Supervisory Regulation," 26 INT'L LAw. 993 (1992) (discussing changes in foreign
bank supervision brought on by the BCCI scandal).
132. See id.
133. See 12 U.S.C. § 3105 (1994); Scott, supra note 94 (discussing the change from previous
policy).
134. See Hultman, supra note 130, at 453 (commenting that comprehensive supervision and
extensive information requirements have contributed to waning foreign interest in the U.S. banking
market).
135. NAFI'A, supra note I, art. 1404(1), 32 I.L.M. at 658.
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between a wholly owned subsidiary and a traditional branch, it seems
overly formalistic that the legal treatment of one should differ from the
In order to accommodate complex corporate groups,
other. 136
international law will have to jettison traditional ideas about corporate
personality, but when the corporate actors operate across national borders
the challenge of harmonizing concepts of enterprise liability is a daunting
one. 137
If a workable solution to the moral hazard can be devised, and if
home and host country regulators can coordinate their efforts in a mutually
agreeable manner, there should be no real difference between a subsidiary
and a branch, and financial services providers should be free to set up their
corporate structures as they see fit. Therefore, if one were writing on a
clean slate to devise the optimal North American legal framework for
structuring the financial services industry one would probably enact a plan
that permits the individual players in the market to determine the corporate
structure they prefer, be it branching or holding company form.
Unfortunately, the NAFT A negotiators are not writing on a clean slate.
They have political, historical, and economic factors unique to their
individual countries that they need to pay attention to. These factors make
the public choice perspective on trade agreements a more useful tool for
underst~ding the cross-border branching issue than the arguments based
on the law of corporate groups.
V. CROSS-BORDER BRANCHING: THE PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE
The traditional way of thinking about trade agreements is to assume
that each trade negotiator will advocate for those results that are in his or
her own country's best interest. By every negotiator doing so, they
eventually reach an agreement that is informed by rational self-interest,
138
In the real
but which may give rise to conflict upon implementation.
world, however, it is misleading to suggest that nations have "interests."
It is much more appropriate to recognize that to the extent a government

136. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCI"URE OF THE CORPORATION 303 (1976) (discussing
that lack of a practical difference between wholly owned subsidiaries and traditional corporate
divisions).
For a traditional view of the rather inconsequential managerial aspects of the
subsidiary/division distinction, see Robert W. Murphy, Corporate Divisions v. Subsidiaries, 34 HARv.
Bus. REV. 83 (Nov.-Dec. 1956).
137. See generally, PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION
LAW: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY (1993) (describing the evolution of
enterprise principles around the world and articulating a jurisprudence of corporate groups).
138. See Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan R. Macey, A Public Choice Model of International
Economic Cooperation and the Decline ofthe Nation State, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 925, 930-32 (1996)
(describing the traditional view as "regime theory" in which negotiators seek to advance the interests
of states).
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takes a position it does so because competing interest groups within the
nation have competed for, and won, government action. 139 The public
140
choice perspective on international agreements suggests that countries
will not agree to terms in a treaty unless the key interest groups in the
country agree and the regulators who deal with the matter find it in their
own best interests to do so. 141
In light of the many demands of the constituents they represent, we
would expect trade negotiators to make agreements that maximize their
own interest groups' competitive positions, even if the theoretically
optimal position would be somewhat different. Any attempt at regional
integration will succeed only if the self-interests of key actors and interest
groups within the region coincide. 142 In the case of the NAFT A, the
interest groups concerned about cross-border financial services include,
most obviously, the financial services providers of the member countries
and the banking regulators who oversee those businesses.
Each of the member nations has a different perspective on the
attractiveness of cross-border branching, and we can reasonably expect the
member countries not to sacrifice perceived advantages to their trading
Of course, it is difficult to negotiate multilateral trade
partners.
agreements where the parties too vigorously pursue their own economic
self-interest. While in a theoretical world they would all be better off
under a system of completely free trade unencumbered by legal
constructions, in the real world a prisoners' dilemma opens up by which
cooperation and trust take a back seat to the pursuit of self-interest. 143 An

139. See id. (examining the difference between regime theory and public choice theory).
140. The scholars who make up the public choice camp are a somewhat loosely knit group. Their
perspectives on the law draw heavily on economics, game theory, organizational behavior and political
science. See generally DANIEL A FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PuBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 21-33 (1991). See also Daniel A Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The
Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REV. 873, 878-79, 883, 901-06 (1987) (stating a general
theory of "public choice" is impossible, since there are many variations on the set of core principles
that have inspired many of the scholars); SHAUN H. HEAP ET AL., THE THEORY OF CHOICE: A
CRITICAL GUIDE 209-15 ( 1992) (giving a useful overview of the topic, especially of the theoretical
problems of aggregating preferences, which tends to make the output of collective bodies incoherent).
141. See Colombatto & Macey, supra note 138, at 932 ("Public choice theory ... posits that
international institutions are vehicles through which politicians, bureaucrats, and interest groups reflect
their own interests.").
142. See Frederick M. Abbott, Foundation-Building for Western Hemispheric Integration, 17 NW.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 900, 902 (1996-97) (discussing various interest groups, such as business groups,
labor groups, environmental groups, citizen groups and government actors, whose interests would
have to coincide in order to expand the NAFfA into the Free Trade Area of the Americas, and stating
that "[t]he success of a regional integration effort may well depend on the presence of a sufficient
confluence of self-interest among key actors and interest groups throughout economically-important
countries in a region.").
143. See Simser, supra note 5, at 40 (noting the propensity for states negotiating a trade pact to
become subject to a prisoner's dilemma).
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examination of the relative interests of the affected regulators and industry
participants reveals that cross-border branching is a deadlocked issue.
A.

The Interest ofRegulators in the Status Quo

One rent-seeking group infoiming the public choice perspective is the
cadre of regulators who exercise authority over the various aspects of the
financial services industry.
In the United States, the picture is
bewilderingly complex and includes state bank examiners, the FDIC, the
Office of the Comptroller of Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision,
the Department of the Treasury, and the Federal Reserve Board who share
a complicated and redundant regulatory scheme governing U.S. banks. 144
Each of these government actors has some influence and control over the
U.S. banking system and to a greater or lesser extent over foreign branches
doing business in the United States. None of them will willingly give up
their regulatory power without a good reason. Predictably, in the several
occasions when Congress has considered reforming the banking regulatory
scheme, the regulators have mobilized political opposition designed to
protect the existing "turf' controlled by each agency. 145
Canadian regulators fare no better on the turf protection front. Even
though the domestic chain of command in Canada is clearer, on the
international level Canadian regulators are not willing to give up their
regulatory power without a fight. For example, it was understood during
the negotiation of both the FTA and the NAFT A that Canada opposed
cross-border branching in part due to the desire of the Canadian banking
regulators that there be a Canadian bank doing business in the country that
they could regulate. 146 We should expect Mexican regulators to behave
like their American and Canadian counterparts.
The observed turf war mentality is entirely consistent with a public
choice view of the world, which sees regulators as managers who seek to
maximize the value of their enterprises. 147 Because any scheme of cross

144. See GAO Oversight Structure, supra note 12, at 36-56 (describing the redundant function of
the federal banking regulators).
145. See Coffee, supra note 41 (describing the recurrent turf battles); see also Edward J. Kane, The
Evolving U.S. Legislative Agenda in Banking and Finance, in REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE NAFTA COUNTRIES AND BEYOND 186-88 (George M. von
Furstenberg ed., 1997) [hereinafter Kane, Legislative Agenda] (describing one round in the on-going
battle between the Fed and the OCC over the structure of bank activities).
146. See Jordan, supra note 3, at 48 (voicing the opinion that the Canadian trade negotiators did
not yield to the pressures to permit U.S. branches because "Canadian regulators ... wished to ensure
that there was a Canadian entity to be regulated.").
147. See Edward J. Kane, Tension Between Competition and Coordination in International
Financial Regulation, in GoVERNING BANKING'S FuTURE: MARKETS VS. REGULATION 33, 34
(Catherine England ed., 1991) [hereinafter Kane, Tension] (describing the need of regulators to
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border branching that makes sense for the NAFfA member countries will
necessarily require paring away some of the current regulatory load, the
existing regulators who have a vested interest in the current system will
not give up their authority willingly.
The banking regulators of the three countries can be expected to
defend their turf. The NAFfA is based primarily on the idea of host
country regulation. If the treaty leads to greater harmonization, the
members may consider a European style home country regulatory
approach. 148 The home country approach would probably be acceptable to
U.S. and Canadian regulators since banks from their countries are likely to
have the most extensive North American operations. Until that time,
however, the first impulse of the regulators will be to jealously stake out
their territory.
On the other hand, there is a dynamic tension between the regulators
and the regulated that makes regulators sensitive to industry concerns.
The costs of regulation can be quite high, and banking firms to some
extent prefer to choose the regulator they will be covered by. Corporate
structure allows banking organizations some leeway in selecting their
regulators. Subsidiaries are regulated primarily in the jurisdiction in
which they are chartered. The regulation of branches is more complicated:
for prudential matters, such as capital levels and management competence,
the home country regulator has priority, but for market matters, the host
country regulates. Because different countries govern different aspects of
international banking organizations and because regulators act to increase
their jurisdiction, regulators may act as catalysts to change banking
regulation in order to attract more regulatees to their jurisdiction. By
acting to attract banking firms, international regulators compete with one
another for "market share." 149 By attracting firms from other countries,
regulators can increase their power and the value of their regulatory
enterprise.
In the NAFfA countries, regulatory competition seems to favor
Canada and Mexico over the United States. Banks in both of those
countries are freer to engage in a wider range of activities over a wider
geographic area with less bureaucratic interference than are banks
chartered in the United States. In light of this, U.S. regulators may
recognize their competitive disadvantage and may wish to delay cross-

maximize the value of their enterprise within the confines of something he calls the "microeconomic
analysis of financial regulation," which is consistent with the public choice view).
148. See WHITE, supra note 3, at 18 (discussing the home country versus the host country
approach to regulation).
149. See Kane, Tension, supra, note 147, at 35 (noting that banking regulators must be aware of
competition from banking regulators in other countries).
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border branching until the U.S. regulatory scheme can be made more
compatible with international norms.
B.

Interests ofthe Financial Services Industry in the Status Quo

Of course, the structure of the banking industry is not driven solely by
the actions of regulators. The market participants in the financial services
industry also influence the way in which the North American market is
structured. Frequently, the industry's desires must be translated into
political action before they bear fruit. In Mexico and Canada, the financial
services sector is relatively concentrated. The key players in those
countries may be able to mobilize political power to press for their
positions. In the United States, however, the financial services industry is
balkanized. I have already discussed the Glass-Steagall distinction
between commercial and investment banking, but the industry also
includes the insurance industry, thrifts, credit unions, finance companies
and other non-banks engaged in the financial services sector. Even within
the banking industry there are separate camps of common interest ranging
from the money center banks, to the regional banks, to the community
banks. Each of these participants has its own perspective on the wisdom
of financial services modernization, and to date no one group or coalition
of groups has mobilized enough political support to change the structure
of the financial services industry in the United States. 150 Nevertheless,
there are some observations that can be made about the three countries on
the cross-border branching issue.
1.

The United States

Ironically, though the United States has been a leading proponent of
extending formal international trade agreements to cover trade in
services, 151 it seems unlikely that the United States will lead the charge to

150. See Howard Gleckman & Dean Foust, Why Congress Can't Afford to Shatter G/ass-Steagall,
Bus. WK., Mar. 30, 1998, at 38 (commenting that financial services modernization comes up in
Congress about every two years, just in time for massive fundraising from affected industries and
drawing the conclusion that Congress will never change the status quo because it needs the biennial
source of campaign funds).
151. See Simser, supra note 5, at 44-45 (noting that the United States pushed to expand GATT
during the Tokyo round to include trade in services, but the idea turned out to be quite contentious
because: (I) trade in services was already being addressed by the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD); (2) developing countries feared that existing open issues in GATT such
as agriculture and textiles would be linked to concession on trade in services; (3) developing countries
feared any negotiated regime would merely be a way for developed countries to perpetuate their
dominance in the services sector; and (4) the proposals did not deal with the full range of services very
well, but instead focused on capital and technology intensive services and paid scant attention to labor
intensive services).
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bring cross-border branching to the NAFfA countries. The current
structure of cross-border banking via subsidiaries serves U.S. banks very
well. The United States has access to both Canada and Mexico on better
terms than the rest of the world's major banking powers, while Canada
and Mexico have access to the United States on essentially the same terms
as every other country.
Now that U.S. law permits nationwide branching, U.S. banks should
be very reluctant to permit our North American neighbors unfettered
access to our national market, § 1403 of the NAFfA notwithstanding.
American banks need time to establish their own nationwide branching
systems and should not permit our trade representatives to allow Canadian
and Mexican banks to get in on the ground floor of U.S. nationwide
branching. On their home territories both Mexican and Canadian banks
have long established national branch networks that give them a big head
start on any U.S. attempts to enter their respective markets. Besides, there
is significant evidence suggesting that foreign banks in the United States
are less profitable that their U.S. competitors. 152 Because a branch
network should be cheaper and therefore more profitable than a subsidiary
network, permitting true branches will only serve to make foreign banks
more competitive in the United States. The banking lobby will use its
political clout to prevent that from occurring.
2.

Canada

The banking provisions of the NAFT A, as currently written, make
very little difference in the Canadian banking market. As a practical
matter, the Schedule I banks will never be taken over by foreign interests
as long as the "widely held" rule remains in place. 153 In any event, the
Canadian market is already over-banked. The major Canadian banks
dominate the Canadian market and have come to recognize that
opportunities for growth are outside Canada. 154 For American and
Mexican banks, the NAFTA's relatively benign provisions allow slightly
easier access to a mature market where well-established firms have long
customer relationships and efficient operations. 155
152. See Hultman, supra note 130, at 453 (providing statistics showing that the average return on
assets of foreign banks operating in the United States is significantly lower than that of U.S. banks
generally and lower than a cohort group of internationally active U.S. banks); Scon & WELLONS,
supra note 119, at 138 (noting that foreign banks appear to be less efficient and more dependent on
wholesale funding, thereby making their cost of funds higher).
153. See Bank Act, R.S.C., ch. B-1.01, § 370(2) (1996) (Can.) (defining "widely held").
154. See Weber, supra note 80 (noting that Canadian banks are looking south for growth).
155. See James R. Kraus, Canada Plan Would Permit Cross-Border Branches, AM. BANKER, May
22, 1997, at 22 (quoting Canadian banking experts who remark that Canada has a technology and cost
efficiency edge on U.S. banks resulting in lower spreads and the need for high volume to cover costs).
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Foreign financial service providers have found it very difficult to
establish profitable operations in Canada. 156 Although many U.S. banks
maintain a presence in Canada, it is clear they will never be major players
there. 157 Therefore, Canadian banking interests probably do not care
whether the NAFTA member countries are permitted to branch into
Canada, as long as the other markets, especially Mexico, are opened to
Canadian banks in return.
3.

Mexico

Mexico represents a very attractive market for U.S. and Canadian
banks. 158 While the markets in the United States and Canada are fairly
well saturated with banking services, Mexico is dramatically under
160
banked. 159 With the average interest rate on a Mexican loan at 32%,
U.S. banks have been eyeing the potential of the Mexican banking market
for some time. 161 The easiest way for the United States and Canada to get
access to Mexico would be for the NAFT A to provide unfettered, routine
cross-border branching, but based on how events have unfolded since the
enactment of the NAFT A, it is unlikely to receive support from the big
U.S. banks.
Branching will only be a minor issue for the U.S. banks already
present in Mexico. The large U.S. and Canadian banks have already
expanded into Mexico through the subsidiary device. 162 Even in a world
156. See WHITE, supra note 3, at 10 (noting that foreign banks in Canada have failed to achieve
rates of return on equity that even equal the return available from Canadian treasury bills).
!57. See id. (noting that Canada has been a "tough nut to crack" for U.S. banks and pointing out
that in the seventeen years since U.S. banks have been permitted in Canada they have a very limited
presence, with Citicorp, the largest, having merely $4.8 billion in assets, which amounts to about one
half of one percent of total Canadian banking assets).
158. See Zamora, Comments, supra note 6, at 78 (noting attractiveness of Mexican banking
market).
159. See Jordan, supra note 3, at 52 n.43 (noting that at the time of the NAFTA's negotiation only
8% of Mexicans had a checking account and there were an average of 18,500 people per banking
branch in Mexico as opposed to approximately 2,000 people per branch in the United States and
Canada); see also WHITE, supra note 3, at 16 (giving the branching information as 19,000 people per
branch in Mexico versus 2,000 people per branch in the United States and Canada); MacAllister, supra
note 121, at 297 (noting that Mexico is a large, untapped market).
160. See Davis, supra note 56, at 101 (noting the high Mexican interest rate compared to similar
U.S. loans).
161. See Karen Epper, Crowded at Home, U.S. Firms Look to Mexico, AM. BANKER, Jan. 19,
1994, at II. With rates of return on equity in Mexican banks at 27% compared to 13% for U.S. banks
and I0% for Canadian banks, the Mexican banking industry seems to show signs of weak competition.
See WHITE, supra note 3, at 16 (providing return on equity figures).
162. See Drew Clark, Harris Marketers Look to a Mouse That Roars, AM. BANKER, Jan. 7, 1998,
at 14 (describing Bank of Montreal's plan to be the first true North American bank through its
operations in Canada, Mexico and the United States); James R. Kraus, Commercia Near Decision on
Opening Bank in Canada, AM. BANKER, July 2, 1997, at 5 (describing Commercia's North American
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where branches were permitted in Mexico, a banking organization might
decide to expand through a subsidiary to control liability exposure,
especially political risk. Because they have already incurred the expense
and inconvenience of establishing Mexican subsidiaries, 163 it strikes me as
improbable that U.S. banks will become champions of unfettered
branching which would permit late-comers to expand into Mexico at a
lower cost.
There is tremendous room for growth in the Mexican banking
market. 164 Over time the newly created foreign subsidiaries may take a
leadership role in the market. Even with American and other foreign
competition, however, existing Mexican banks have an edge because of
their extensive branch networks (which gives them a diverse geographic
and customer base), solid capital structure, knowledge of their market,
knowledge of the Mexican legal system, and political connections. 165
Even with all these advantages, Mexico has legal protections in place to
prevent its banking system from falling into foreign hands.
Perhaps aware that its banking market was ripe for picking under the
NAFTA, Mexico has reserved a degree of state-supported protection for
its banking industry during a six-year period following the enactment of
the treaty. After the transition period however, foreign investors will be
limited to acquiring institutions that control less than four percent of the

strategy); Fluckiger, supra note 60, at 82 (describing the Mexican operations of Bank of Nova Scotia,
Bank of Montreal, Wells Fargo, and NationsBank); Weber, supra note 80 (noting that Canadian
bankers are looking south for growth).
163. See Palace, supra note 72, at 162 (describing the flurry of application approved by U.S.
banking organizations to engage in a range of activities in Mexico).
164. Somewhat surprisingly, given that the United States has had relatively easy access to the
Canadian market for a much longer time than it has been able to do business freely in Mexico, total
U.S. bank exposure to the two countries is almost equal. See FED. FIN. INST. EXAM. COUNCIL
STATISTICAL RELEASE, Jan. 14, 1998, at 1-2 (showing total exposure of all reporting banks to Canada
to be $21.302 billion and to Mexico to be $17.978 billion; of that amount exposure by money center
banks-defined as Bank of America, Bankers Trust, Chase Manhattan, Citicorp, First Chicago and J.P.
Morgan-was $12.743 billion to Canada and $14.385 billion to Mexico, id. at 17-18; other large
banks-defined as BankBoston Corp., Bank of New York Co., Corestates Financial Corp., First Union
Corp., Nationsbank Corp., Republic NY Corp., and State Street Corp.-had exposure of $6.354 billion
to Canada and $1.227 billion to Mexico, id. at 33-34; finally, all other reporting banks had exposure of
$2.205 billion to Canada and $2.366 billion to Mexico). These numbers perhaps reflect the relative
size of the Mexican and Canadian economies. Using 1993 conversion rates, Canada's GNP was 8.7%
of the U.S. GNP, while using 1992 conversion rates Mexican GNP was 5.5% of U.S. GNP. See
WHITE, supra note 3, at I n.l (providing figures). The different growth rates of the two economies
may have produced a different result in 1997.
165. See Thomas Heather, Comments on Financial Services, Other Services, and Temporary Entry
Rules, I U.S.-MEXICO L.J. 73, 75 (1993) (listing advantages held by Mexican firms in the post
NAFTA Mexican banking market); MacAllister, supra note 121, at 303-04 (noting many potential
competitive advantages of Mexican banks in the retail and commercial banking markets, including the
ability of customers of Mexican banks to pay their utility bills at the bank).
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capital in the banking system. 166 This limitation should effectively place
the most important Mexican banks beyond the reach of any foreign
acquirer. So Mexico, like Canada, has essentially protected its leading
banking firms from foreign takeover.
While Mexico has obtained a degree of protection at home, they may
also desire to cross the border into the southern tier of the United States to
provide banking services to the substantial Hispanic populations in those
states. 167 Mexican banks were already doing business in the southwestern
United States, primarily through subsidiaries, prior to the enactment of the
NAFfA. 168 Mexican banks would probably prefer to service that market
through a branch network; therefore, depending on how attractive the U.S.
market is deemed to be, the Mexican negotiators may be willing to make
some concessions on branching.
C.

Specific Aspects of Comparative Advantage Among the NAFTA
Countries

In addition to the general considerations discussed above, several
specific aspects of comparative advantage in the three countries deserve
attention: the safety net subsidy, economies of scope, and economies of
scale. This section discusses those items and ends with a brief overview
of some other comparative advantage matters that may be significant for
further NAFfA negotiations.

1.

The Safety Net Subsidy Question

A matter that could weigh heavily in deciding whether branching is to
be preferred to expansion by subsidiary is whether U.S. banks enjoy a
subsidy from the federal government. 169 If our banks do receive such a
subsidy, and existing firewalls make it difficult to pass the benefit of the
subsidy upstream to the holding company, banks should be clamoring for
branching rights since that would permit them to exploit the benefit of the
subsidy in addition to all the other benefits of branching.
166. See NAFfA, supra note I, Annex VII(B)(13), 32 I.L.M. at 775.
167. See Davis, supra note 56, at 99 (noting that Mexican banks are especially interested in
cultivating the southwestern border region of the United States). But see Andrea Gerlini, In This
Texas Town, Their Favorite Bank is Mattress Savings, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 1996, at AI (noting
market research showing that Hispanics are reluctant to use banking services).
168. See Cogan, supra note 57, at 770 (noting the presence of Mexican banking subsidiaries in the
United States since 1978).
169. See David G. Oedel, Puzzling Banking Law: Its Effects and Purposes, 67 U. Cow. L. REv.
477, 479 (1996) ("banking law enshrines fundamental economic inefficiencies in banking that are
tolerable for banks because of breathtaking anti-competitive protections and financial subsidies
protections and subsidies that are not always apparent to outsiders nor admitted publicly by banking
savants.").
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The Federal Reserve Board clearly believes that the federal banking
safety net provides the U.S. banking industry with a subsidy vis-a-vis
other financial services providers. 170 Although Chairman Greenspan sees
the creation of a subsidy to banking as an "undesirable but unavoidable
consequence of creating a safety net," 171 he believes that the subsidy
should be contained within the bank to the extent possible in order to
prevent the transfer of the sovereign credit subsidy for non-banking
purposes which might result in a "subsidized competitive advantage" to
the bank affiliate. 172
Others, most notably the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
173
question whether a net subsidy to the U.S. banking industry exists.
Of
course, bankers do not believe they receive a subsidy - pointing to the
deposit insurance premiums, capital requirements, and regulatory costs as
evidence that they pay for whatever benefit they receive from the safety
net. 174 Officials from the FDIC and the Department of Treasury have also

170. See generally Myron L. Kwast & S. Wayne Passmore, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, The Subsidy Provided by the Federal Safety Net: Theory, Measurement and
Containment (1997) (articulating a theory that the government's commitment to the prevention of a
systematic banking crisis provides a subsidy to banks). See also Statement of Alan Greenspan,
Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Before the Subcommittee on Financial
Institutions and Consumer Credit of the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, U.S. House of
Representatives, Feb. 13, 1997, reprinted in 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 249 (Apr. 1997) [hereinafter Greenspan
Statement] (stating "In this century the Congress has delegated the use of sovereign credit-the power
to create money and borrow unlimited funds at the lowest possible rate-to support the banking
system. It has done so indirectly as a consequence of deposit insurance, Federal Reserve discount
window access, and final riskless payment system transactions ... [As a result of the government's
major role in protecting the banking system, banks get an unfair advantage over other financial
services providers because banks] determine the level of risk-taking and receive gains therefrom, but
do not bear the full costs of that risk. The remainder of the risk is transferred to the government.").
171. Greenspan Statement, supra note 170, at 250.
172. /d.
173. See GARY WHALEN, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, THE COMPETITIVE
IMPLICATIONS OF SAFETY NET-RELATED SUBSIDIES (1997) (examining the existing empirical
evidence addressing the subsidy question and concluding that even if some evidence points to a small
gross subsidy, it cannot be taken at face value because the studies fail to take the costs of regulation
into account).
174. See Janet Seiberg, Banks' Plea To Fed: Stop Saying We're Subsidized, AM. BANKER, Nov. 5,
1997, at I (noting the banking industry's arguments). The Fed's subsidies generated a flurry of
pointed comments in AMERICAN BANKER, the newspaper of record for the U.S. banking industry. See
Bert Ely, Comment: Greenspan's Deposit Insurance Subsidy Argument Is Nonsense, AM. BANKER,
June 6, 1997, at 3 (stating that deposit insurance has never cost taxpayers a cent, loans from the
discount window must be collateralized and the small risk of intraday overdraft risk can be minimized
by proper management and concluding there is no meaningful subsidy); Warren G. Heller, To The
Editor: It Sure Looks Like a Subsidy to Me, AM. BANKER, June 17, 1997, at 7 (arguing that if one
considers the historical support of the banking system, there is a net subsidy); Bert Ely, Letter to the
Editor: Congress Has Largely Ended Deposit Insurance Subsidy, AM. BANKER, July 2, 1997, at 9
(responding to criticism and noting that historical problems have been remedied by congressional
action).
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raised questions about the existence of a subsidy, especially in light of
175
.
regu1at10n costs.
While the debate over the existence and extent of the safety net
subsidy in the context of domestic banking policy drags on, the issue has a
different dimension in the international context. Intuitively, U.S. bankers
would, if such a subsidy exists, insist on engaging in cross-border
branching as soon as possible so that the U.S. banks could exploit the
subsidy in our neighboring countries. But in the international setting, such
an argument is off the mark because all important banking countries
bestow some kind of systemic default guarantee that acts to protect
depositors and subsidize banks. 176 The mere existence of such a subsidy
does not explain one country's competitive success in the banking market
vis-a-vis banks from other countries, but rather success is more likely
determined by a combination of "comparative advantage, the
fundamentals of each economy, and governmental support in the form of
safety net policies." 177 So while the safety net subsidy is part of the
picture, it is only part. On the international level the important question to
ask in not "does a subsidy exist", but rather "how big is one subsidy
compared to the subsidies provided by the other countries?"
It appears from the available evidence, for example, that the safety net
subsidy enjoyed by European and Japanese banks is greater than the
subsidy bestowed upon U.S. banks. 178 Canada's banks enjoy safety-net
benefits from their deposit insurance system and central bank similar to
the benefits bestowed upon U.S. banks by the FDIC and the Fed. 179 One
might surmise from the difference in the regulatory burden between the
United States and Canada that the net subsidy to Canadian banks exceeds

175. See Olaf de Senerpont Domis, Helfer, Ludwig Insist Deposit Insurance Doesn't Give Banks
an Unfair Advantage, AM. BANKER, Mar. 6, 1997, at 2 (recounting the testimony of Comptroller of
the Currency Eugene Ludwig and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Chairman Ricki Helfer that
the Fed's subsidy argument is incorrect because it does not take regulatory compliance costs into
account); Remarks of John D. Hawke, Jr., Under Secretary of the Treasury for Domestic Finance,
AALS Annual Meeting, San Francisco, Jan. 8, 1998, Panel Discussion on What is the Governmental
Role in Finance, Anyway?, 3 (manuscript on file with author) (expressing skepticism of the existence
of a net subsidy).
176. See Colombatto & Macey, supra note 138, at 941.
177. HAL S. SCOTI & SHINSAKU IWAHARA, IN SEARCH OF A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD: THE
IMPLEMENTATJONOFTHEBASLE CAPITAL ACCORD IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 1 (1994).

178. See Hal S. Scott, The Competitive Implications of the Basle Capital Accord, 39 ST. LoUIS
U. L.J. 885, 887 (1995) (noting the relative stability of European and Japanese banks generally
compared to U.S. banks and noting that creditors will demand higher interest rates from United States
banks because the overall risk of lending to United States banks is higher).
179. See Reforms Needed for Financial Services to Flourish Says CBA, CANADA NEWSWIRE, Oct.
29, 1997 (reporting on Canadian Bankers Association report that urges reevaluation of the "special
privileges" accorded to Canadian banks, such as deposit insurance, liquidity support from the Bank of
Canada, and access to the payment system).
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the U.S. subsidy. As to Mexican banks, the overall quality of the
country's commitment to its banking system, although recently tested by
the peso crisis, probably does not translate into a very big subsidy for
Mexican banks (especially with the memory of nationalization still
relatively fresh in the collective consciousness of the industry). On the
matter of safety net subsidy, therefore, Canada would appear to have the
edge and would therefore desire to branch directly across national borders
to capitalize on the subsidy. American and Mexican banks would be
expected to resist.
2.

Economies of Scope

An economy of scope occurs when it is cheaper for one firm to
produce two products together than it would be for two separate firms to
produce the separate products independently. 180 The artificial
compartmentalization of the U.S. financial services market effectively
prevents banking organizations from realizing meaningful economies of
scope. Studies examining the issue have found that there is no consistent
evidence of global economies of scope in banking, although there is some
evidence of product specific economies of scope in production. 181 The
lack of academic literature supporting the existence of economies of scope
in banking has been offered as an argument against breaking down the
artificial barriers that define U.S. commercial banking. 182
The weakness of the literature, however, is that is focuses on the
banking industry as it currently exists. If the barriers between commercial
and investment banking were eliminated, many observers of the banking
business believe economies of scope would be significant. 183 Therefore,
180. See Loretta J. Mester, Efficient Production of Financial Services: Scale and Scope of
Economies, FED. RESERVE BANK OF PHILA. BUS. REV. 15, 15-16 (Jan./Feb. 1987).
181. See Jeffery A. Clark, Economies of Scale and Scope at Depositary Financial Institutions: A
Review of the Literature, 73 FED. RESERVE BANK KAN. CITY EcoN. REV. 16, 26 (Sept./Oct. 1988)
(reviewing the literature and finding little evidence of meaningful overall economies of scope, but
finding support for the idea that there may exist cost complementarity for some pairs of products); see
also William Curt Hunter & Stephen G. Timme, Does Multi-product Production in l.Llrge Banks
Reduce Costs?, 74 ECON. REV. FED. RESERVE BANK ATLANTA 2 (May/June 1989) (finding that multi
product production does not necessarily result in lower costs of production).
182. See Leach Circulates GAO Study Criticizing Mixing of Banking and Commerce, 16 No. 7
BANKING PoL'Y REP. 10, 12 (Apr. 1997) (quoting House Republican Conference Chair John Boehner
(R-Ohio) stating "the virtually unanimous finding in the literature is that economies of scope are
insignificant in banking").
183. See David M. Eaton, The Commercial Banking-Related Activities of Investment Banks and
Other Nonbanks, 44 EMORY L.J. 1187, 1206 n.127 (1995) (citing ROBERT E. LITAN, WHAT SHOULD
BA>'IKS Do? 60 (1987) for the proposition that combining financial products will result in economies
of scope); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and Commercial
Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan and the United States, 48 STAN. L. REV. 73,
110 (1995) (noting economies of scope between banks and their securities affiliates); Joseph J. Norton
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the ability of U.S. banks to achieve meaningful economies of scope likely
depends on repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act. This, in turn, will be a
multifaceted U.S. domestic political question.
Glass-Steagall has
essentially provided the U.S. securities industry with a generous subsidy
and the industry is unlikely to give up the advantages of the law without a
fight.l84
To the extent U.S. banks are unable to exploit economies of scope,
they are at a competitive disadvantage to their Canadian and Mexican
competitors. At the anecdotal level, since Canada has permitted banks to
acquire securities dealers as subsidiaries, all of the major Canadian
securities dealers are now owned by banks. 185 Although cause and effect
are difficult to prove, all three U.S. brokerage firms with a presence m
Canada in 1987 had withdrawn from the market by 1994. 186
3.

Economies of Scale

When a firm can increase its level of output and experience a decline
in the average cost of production, economies of scale exist, since it costs
proportionately less to produce at a larger scale. 187 Although researchers
have long studied the existence of economies of scale in the banking
industry, results of those studies do not paint a clear picture. 188 Although
not all of the studies make the distinction explicitly, some studies have
examined the question of whether overall economies of scale exist in the

& Christopher D. Olive, The Ongoing Process of International Bank Regulatory and Supervisory

Convergence: A New Regulatory-Market "Pannership," 16 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 227, 276 n.l70
(1997) (explaining that economies of scope could arise in combining commercial and investment
banking because information gathering function is an important part of both businesses); George A
Walker, The Law of Financial Conglomerates: The Next Generation, 30 INT'L LAW. 57, 63 (1996)
(noting that one advantage of conglomeration is the presence of economies of scope).
184. See Donna L. Lance, Note, Can the Glass-Steagall Act be Justified Under the Global Free
Trade Market Policies of the NAFTA?, 34 WASHBURN L.J. 297, 298 (1995) (observing that Glass
Steagall has shielded the U.S. securities industry from domestic competition from commercial banks
and thereby bestowed a subsidy to the securities industry).
185. See WHITE, supra note 3, at I 0.
186. See id.
187. See Mester, supra note 180.
188. The earliest empirical studies of economies of scale tended to show that scale economies in
banking were relatively unimportant. See Richard W. Nelson, Economies of Scale v. Regulation as
Determinants of U.S. Banking Structure, in PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE ON BANK STRUCTURE
AND COMPETITION 462 (1983). Studies during the 1960s, however, found significant economies of
scale in the banking industry. See FREDERICK W. BELL & NEIL B. MURPHY, ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN
COMMERCIAL BANKING 8, 8-9 (1967) (analyzing data obtained in 1965, showed that unit costs
declined significantly as banks expanded operations); George J. Benston Economies of Scale and
Marginal Costs in Banking Operations 2 NAT'L BANKING REV. 507, 541 (June 1965) (using data from
the early 1960s concluded that economies of scale were observed in each of several different banking
services analyzed).
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industry, while other studies have examined whether product-specific
economies of scale exist 189
Studies in the 1970s and 1980s, evaluating the existence of overall
economies of scale in the banking industry, almost unanimously
concluded that economies of scale either did not exist or were exhausted
for the most part by the time banks had accumulated assets ranging from
$25 million to $100 million. 190 Because of problems in the methodology
and data, 191 however, it is probably safe to say that the final word on
overall economies of scale has not yet been written, especially since
studies at the product-specific level have reached significantly different
conclusions.
While studies during the 1970s and 1980s consistently concluded that
overall economies of scale in the banking industry either do not exist or
disappear after relatively low output levels, other studies prepared during
the period have tended to show that some product-specific economies of
scale do exist. 192 Intuitively, it seems obvious that economies of scale, at
least on the product-specific level, should exist in banking. As an
example, in order to produce consumer loans, banks must invest in a
certain amount of legal work, form preparation, training, record keeping,
189. The difference appears to be crucial. Because banks are multi-product firms, the cost
structure can be analyzed either as a function of the entire product mix or as a function of each
individual product. Only recently have economists developed the mathematical tools to meaningfully
explore overall economies of scale in a multi-product firm as a function of the entire product mix.
190. See Clark, supra note 181, at 26 (noting 13 empirical studies finding that overall economies
of scale appear to exist only at low levels of output, while diseconomies of scale appear at large output
levels); George J. Benston et a!., Economies of Scale and Scope in Banking, in PROCEEDINGS OF A
CONFERENCE ON BANK STRUCfURE AND COMPETITION 432, 452 (1983) (concluding that there are no
overall scales of economy below low output levels); see also A. Sinan Cebenoyan, Multi-Product Cost
Functions and Scale Economies in Banking, 23 FIN. REV. 499 (Nov. 1988); Thomas Gilligan &
Michael Smirlock, An Empirical Study of Joint Production and Scale Economies in Commercial
Banking, 8 J. BANKING & FIN. 67, 67-77 (1984) (finding scale economies in small banks, but
diseconomies in large banks).
191. The conclusions of the studies are subject to the following caveats: a) they all relied on an
evaluative technique known as the translog cost function, but that function may contain deficiencies
causing it to invariably find a U-shaped cost curve, see James E. McNulty, Economies of Scale:
Discussion, in PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE ON BANK STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION 456, 457
(1983); b) the data sample analyzed by various researchers came from the Federal Reserve's
functional cost analysis system (FCA), which consists of only approximately 700-800 banks, is not a
random sample, is a voluntary reporting scheme and likely contains information from a
disproportionate number of banks that are concerned about their costs for some reason or another, id.;
c) the studies do not include banks with over a billion dollars in assets, see e.g. Benston et a!.,
Economies of Scale and Scope in Banking, supra note 190, at 433. Very large banks could display the
kinds of scale economies that would challenge the existing findings. In today' s market, a billion dollar
bank is not all that large. This is a serious shortcoming in the data.
192. See Peter Maloney, Merging Trust Operations, 98 U.S. BANKER, June I, 1989, at 37-38
(finding that banks can capitalize on significant economies of scale by combining trust departments in
one operational unit); John P. Mara, The New Economics of Mortgaging, 49 MORTGAGE BANKING,
Mar. 1989, at 89-94 (reporting that evidence suggests technologically induced economies of scale exist
in mortgage banking and servicing and do not diminish until volumes reached about $2.5 billion).
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and other start up costs. Banks incur these costs irrespective of the
number of loans actually made. Because there is a large fixed-cost start
up expense, the average cost per loan should decrease as a function of the
number of loans made since the start up cost will be spread over a larger
number of loans. Therefore, the bank that produces more consumer loans
should, on average, be able to produce those loans at a lower average cost
than its less productive competitor, all things being equal.
More recent studies have specifically investigated whether the
production of consumer loans, which have high regulatory compliance
costs, display scale economies. One study found substantial economies of
scale in compliance with Regulation B. Larger banks spent more on
compliance than smaller banks, but a 5.7% change in compliance cost was
accompanied by a 10% change in the amount of credit extended. 193
A later study found significant economies of scale in compliance
costs for Regulations Z and B for commercial banks at levels of output of
up to 375,000 consumer credit accounts, beyond which there are small
diseconomies of scale. 194 The study concluded that "at the lowest output
levels, large, unexploited scale economies exist, suggesting that
Regulations Z and B impose a competitive disadvantage on banks with
small consumer credit portfolios. Scale economies, however, decrease
rapidly as output increases and are exhausted at a moderate level of
output." 195 As of this writing, the scale economy question is still
unresolved. The studies to date do, however, seem to point to a few
salient conclusions: (1) within banking organizations scales of economy
are modest; (2) with regard to specific high volume products such as credit
cards and checking acc'ounts, the scales of economy may be significant;
and (3) large money center banks do appear to enjoy a cost economy in
that they can attract capital at a lower cost than their competitors. 196
In the NAFfA context, some North American bankers may harbor the
concern that the production of banking products and services could have
such economies of scale that large banking organizations inevitably will

193. See Neil B. Murphy, Economies of Scale in the Cost of Compliance with Consumer Credit
Protection Laws: The Case of the Implementation of the Equal Credit Opponunity Act of 1974, 10 J.
BANK REsERVES 248, 250 (Winter 1980). The study, however, was based on a very small sample of
banks, and also evaluated the costs of compliance at the very outset of Regulation B' s existence. This
data ·may not reflect long run compliance costs because the survey was conducted less than one year
after the original Regulation B became effective. See GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN & ROBERT D. KURTZ,
BOARD OF GoVERNORS OF THE fEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, SCALE ECONOMIES AND COMPLIANCE
COSTS FOR CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION: TRUTH-IN-LENDING AND EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY
LAws, Staff Study number 144, I n. 3 (1985).
194. See ELLIEHAUSEN & KURTZ, supra note 193, at I 0.
!95. Id.
196. See RosE, supra note 13, at 106-07 (discussing economy of scale studies).
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197

come to dominate the market.
The data does not support that
conclusion. Even if the threat of large banks may be unfounded, however,
the perception of a threat is as good as a threat for political purposes, so
community banks in the United States will rail against cross-border
branching on the theory that U.S. money center banks and their huge
Canadian and Mexican counterparts will squeeze small community banks
out of the competitive picture entirely.
4.

Other Aspects of Comparative Advantage

There certainly are many other factors in the complex web of
economic forces that tip the balances one way or another in favor of one
country or the next. One point that cannot be ignored is the strength and
stability of the home economies in each country. On this point, the United
States is clearly "head and shoulders" above its two partners. The U.S.
economy is mature, diverse, and immense. Mexico's and Canada's
economies are each about ten percent the size of the U.S. economy.
Canada and Mexico are also both making the transition from being
primarily natural resources-based economies to being centered more on
manufacturing and services. A strong U.S. economy means strong U.S.
banks, which should translate into a comparative advantage.
Another aspect of comparative advantage is the relative strengths of
the banking industries as they currently exist. Canadian banks excel at
retail banking delivered through a wide ranging branch network. 198 With
nationwide branching in the United States now enacted, the U.S.
subsidiaries of Canadian banks should be able to exploit this expertise, but
not as efficiently as they would if they could merely branch from home.
Canada enjoys an advantage in the Mexican market, which is quite under
banked and would seem to favor an organization skilled in delivering
retail banking services. 199 American banks are probably most skilled at
complying with regulations and, therefore, they should be accorded some
merit in recognition of this characteristic.
Another economic fact that will affect the parties' perspectives on the
branching issue is the cost of funds. Loans made in Mexico frequently are

197. Of course the data do not clearly support the contention that large banks enjoy economies of
scale. Hence, the predictions of the demise of the small community bank appear to be greatly
exaggerated. See generally DONALD R. FRASER & JAMES W. KOLAR!, THE FuTURE OF SMALL BANKS
IN A DEREGULATED ENVIRONMENT (1985); Paul Nadler Lending Strategies: Why the Community Bank
Thrives, I COMM. LENDING REV. 71 (Spring 1986).
198. See Jordan, supra note 3, at 54 (noting that Canadian banks are arguably more competitive
than U.S. banks in retail banking).
199. See WHITE, supra note 3, at 17 (opining that Canadian banks have an initial advantage under
a straight-forward branching scheme).
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denominated in U.S. dollars. American banks know this, and will be very
wary about providing easy branching to Mexican banks that will permit
access to low cost funds through a deposit gathering network.
Of course, as the only developing country in the NAFfA group,
Mexico faces some special challenges on the monetary front. Banking
restrictions on foreign denominated liabilities will prevent Mexican banks
from becoming too much engaged in the collection of U.S. dollar
deposits. 200 Eliminating the foreign currency restrictions may destabilize
the peso and will certainly increase the foreign currency exchange risk of
Mexican banks. Therefore, to the extent Mexican borrowers need U.S.
dollar-denominated loans, American banks enjoy an advantage.
VI. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
If the cross-border branching issue is considered in isolation, it seems
unlikely that the status quo will be altered. An optimist would argue that
at least unanimous Pareto optimal transactions, that is, actions where at
least one party is made better off and no other party is made worse off,
should be made. 201 But on closer inspection, it seems that any departure
from the status quo will have winners and losers (at least in terms of
comparative advantage), so the universe of potential Pareto optimal moves
is an empty set. 202 Because changes to the NAFfA require unanimous
agreement, if the branching provisions are considered in isolation, without
some countervailing bargaining chip to even out the tradeoffs, a departure
from the status quo will not occur. It seems likely that the cross-border
branching issue will not be resolved until there is some exogenous shock
to the status quo that realigns the interests of the players and regulators in
the current regime.
An event on the horizon that could supply that shock is the agreed
upon renegotiation of insurance powers that must take place before
January 1, 2000?03 As between the United States and Canada, there are
not many issues relating to insurance worth fighting about, 204 but the
Mexican insurance market is still largely closed to foreign investment.
Given recent changes in the U.S. bank regulatory scheme permitting banks
200. See Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 59, at 31 (noting the regulatory restrictions on Mexican
banks' exposure to foreign currency risk).
201. See Maxwell L. Stearns, The Point of Pareto, Dueling Edgeworths, and Assessing
Institutional Comparative Advantage, in Pl!BUC CHOICE AND PuBLIC LAW: READINGS AND
COMMENTARY 362 (Maxwell L. Stearns ed., 1997).
202. See Guido Calebresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J.
1211, 1216 (1991) (noting that objectors to change believe they will1ose something from the change).
203. See NAFrA, supra note I, Annex 1404.4, 32 I.L.M. at 662.
204. See Jordan, supra note 3, at 51 (noting that few restrictions on U.S.-Canada insurance activity
existed before or after the FfA).
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easier access to the insurance business, the banking lobby may send the
message to our trade negotiators that Mexican bank branching into the
U.S. market will be acceptable in exchange for greater access to Mexico's
insurance market.
Another possible exogenous shock to the system could be the reform
of the U.S. federal banking scheme. Such a reform could result in a single
federal banking regulator205 - secure in its own position - that could enter
into a NAFT A negotiation without fear of giving up too much domestic
regulatory power. Recent attempts by Congress to rebalance the power of
the various federal banking regulators, however, have resulted in
protracted turf battles without any real progress toward reform, 206 so this
event may never come to pass.
Perhaps the shock to the system will result from regulators realizing
that in the fast changing technological world, borders are increasingly
irrelevant to the transaction of banking business. Some "banking"
transactions conducted over the Internet, for example, may escape
effective regulation by "falling through the cracks" of national borders. 207
Perhaps through cooperation, international regulators could divide the pie
of Internet transactions in a way that preserves their relative market
positions.
If no dramatic shock materializes, it seems unlikely that the deadlock
will end. It seems a pity, however, to perpetuate the problematic approach
to bank expansion currently in place merely because banks perceive
disadvantages to change. It may be possible, with the appropriate
leadership, for the various players in the North American financial
services market to seek out common ground instead of merely defending
their current turf. From the industry's perspective, some kind of
harmonization across North America would be highly desirable. It could
lower compliance costs and make planning much more reliable. When
viewed through a public choice lens, harmonization may also be

205. There has been a clamor for a more rational system of banking regulation for several years.
In a recent Congress the testimony sounded more like a bureaucratic turf battle than a genuine
articulation of the best route for public policy. Although the immediate prospects for a single federal
regulator have passed, the idea retains its attractiveness. See GAO Oversight Structure, supra note 12,
at 78 (calling for a reduction in the number of federal agencies with primary responsibilities for bank
oversight).
206. See Kane, Legislative Agenda, supra 145, at 186-88 (noting the turf battle between the
Federal Reserve Board and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency over authorization and
oversight of new banking powers); see also Alan Yonan, Jr., Fed's Greenspan Backs Bank Bill Rubin
Opposes, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 1998, at A6 (describing an incipient turf battle between the Treasury
Department and the Fed over the structure of the banking industry).
207. See Richard Blackwell, Under Siege: So What?, FIN. POST, Oct. 4, 1997, at 12, available in
LEXIS, Canada Library, Finspt File (noting the concern of Canadian regulators that they may be
losing regulatory authority over "Canadian" banking transactions conducted over the Internet).
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acceptable to regulators. Harmonization would reduce much of the
regulatory competition that erodes regulators' market share.
By
standardizing the regulatory product, the regulators could form a cartel to
control the supply of regulation. 208 To proceed in this direction, the
parties would first need to identify the goals of the NAFTA. It seems the
foremost goal is to promote the regional development and to facilitate
trade. This goal, while admirable, is too broad to have any meaning for
specific industry participants.
A second goal of the NAFfA is to enhance competition. Liberalizing
cross-border trade in financial services should increase competition (or at
least the threat of competition), which could, in turn, reduce prices, help
eliminate inefficient regulation, and otherwise improve the market for
financial services. 209 Of course, even if increased competition would be a
legitimate national goal in a perfect world, it is clearly not something that
the existing players in the market would welcome. In addition, the
positive effects of increased competition are not limitless. Much of
existing banking regulation is intended to rein in competition rather than
to foster it. In the United States, we have made a public policy choice to
trade off the benefits of competition for the benefits of a more stable
banking system. 210 A moment's reflection makes clear that perfect
competition in the financial market is not only unattainable, it is probably
undesirable as well, because increased competition tends to result in less
. stab"l"
systermc
1 1ty. 211
Finally, the NAFT A promotes stability. This goal may be the
common ground that all the parties can subscribe to. As recently as 1985,
in Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 212 the United States Supreme Court stated that "banking and
related financial activities are of profound local concern."213 Yet, recent
208. See Kane, Tension, supra note 147, at 34 (articulating the cartel idea).
209. See Emesto Aguirre, International Economic Integration and Trade in Financial Services:
Analysis from a Latin American Perspective, 27 LAw & PoL'Y lNT'L Bus. 1057, 1060 (1996) (stating
that "liberalization may raise the average efficiency of industry, and this should be reflected in lower
prices for financial services and products.").
210. See NICHOLAS A. LASH, BANKING LAWS AND REGULATIONS: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
23 (1987) (noting the value our system places on stability in the banking system).
211. The U.S. experience with "free banking" during the nineteenth century illustrates the pros and
cons of unfettered competition. On the good side, the free banking era was marked by almost pure
competition: barriers to entry were low, there were many participants in the banking market, and
government interference was kept to a minimum. On the bad side, the era was marked by frequent
bank failures, unstable money, and widespread fraud. See John Steele Gordon, Understanding the
S&L Mess, AM. HERITAGE, Feb./Mar. 1991, at 49, 56-58; KERRY COOPER & DONALD R. FRASER,
BANKING DEREGULATION AND THE NEW COMPETITION IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 46 ( 1984) (providing
details about the free banking era).
212. 472 u.s. 159 (1985).
213. ld. at 177 (quoting Lewis v. B.T.Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27,38 (1980)).
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experiences with the Asian monetary crisis remind us that our domestic
economy is inextricably entwined with the global economy. In North
America, the peso crisis of 1994 spilled over into other Latin American
countries, especially the leading markets of Brazil, Peru, Chile, and
Argentina. 214 When instability of global dimensions shakes the world's
financial markets, everyone worries. Bankers may find some value in
rationalizing the international regulatory scheme to enhance stability.
Inevitably, the banking industry will find itself subject to an
increasing number of international agreements affecting the trade of
services generally, 215 and the regulation of banking in particular.
Although multinational trading agreements covering industries as
complicated as the financial services industry take a long time to evolve,
on the regulation front banking regulators have begun a movement toward
216
greater cooperation.
The NAFT A itself does not require the signatory
countries to take any meaningful steps toward harmonization of their
respective domestic laws regulating financial services, 217 although in the
securities area, U.S. and Canadian regulators already have worked toward
and achieved a considerable degree of harmonization of federal, state, and
provincial securities regulation. 218
If harmonization does proceed, the negotiators will need to grapple
with the issue of what role, if any, is left for local control over those
matters which are of local importance such as lending policies, the
availability of credit and market-related matters. In North America, this
question is still very much an open one, exacerbated as it is by the
differences in economic power and political systems among the three
countries of the region. We have not yet devised a process that allows
balancing of all the public and private, local, state, federal, and

214. SeeSCO"IT& WELLONS, supra note 119, at 1294.
215. For example, the General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS") has already begun to
have some effect on the international provision of banking services. See generally Simser, supra note
5 (describing the structure of the GATS and its implications for the trade in financial services).
216. See Joseph J. Norton, Trends in International Bank Supervision and the Baste Committee on
Banking Supervision, 48 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 415, 415-19 (1995) (summarizing some of the
issues confronting the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision).
217. See Trachtman, supra note 125, at 94 (noting that the NAFTA does not require financial
regulation harmonization). But see Zamora, Harmonization, supra note 125, at 414-15 (arguing that
increased cross-border contact between businesspeople, bureaucrats, lawyers, academics and others
will inevitably lead to an exchange of ideas and accommodation in each of the three countries of the
cultural differences of the others); Aman. supra note 125 (arguing that global political and economic
forces push national policies towards various forms of deregulation and privatization).
218. See Jordan, supra note 3, at 53 (noting that the Canadian scheme of securities regulation is
modeled after the U.S. scheme and that the regulators have achieved considerable integration).
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international interests that are affected in cross-border policy-making. 219
Although the NAFfA reaches across borders, it in some ways only serves
to reinforce the idea of the nation state, 220 in a world informed by the
public choice perspective it must be so. That perspective aside, however,
if the governments of the three NAFfA countries truly aspire toward
improving the lot of their citizens, they must find a way to move beyond
national politics in order to implement the best practice approaches that
will benefit everyone in North America. 221 In the end, perhaps one of the
benefits of trade will be that we begin to think of ourselves more as "North
Americans" and less as Mexicans, Americans, and Canadians. When we
begin to forge that common link, the political will to permit trade across
national borders with no more formality that we now require for interstate
trade may gain ground and even overcome the resistance of particular
groups who oppose change because of their own short-term economic
interests.
VII. CONCLUSION

In a perfect world, form follows function. In that world, banking
organizations that profit from the activities of subsidiaries would bear
responsibility for their subsidiaries' business, at least to some extent.
Alternatively, in a world where freedom of choice is highly valued, firms
would be free to choose whether to organize their operations as
subsidiaries, branches, or agencies based on the dictates of their own
business plan rather than the dictates of the regulatory scheme. In the
world we live in, however, choices are constrained by the parties who
have an interest in the outcome of the process. In the cross-border
banking context, that means the regulators who will have to give up power
under a new system, and market participants who may have to sacrifice
perceived market advantages embedded in the status quo. For any real
change to occur, the regulators and the industry participants will have to
see that change is in their own best interests. Such a change may occur
through an exogenous shock to the current status quo that forces a
realignment of interest or through the process of international regulation of
219. See generally Stephen Zamora, Allocating Legislative Competence in the Americas: The
Early Experience Under NAFTA and the Challenge of Hemispheric Integration, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L.
615 (1997) (discussing the problem of balancing legislative power in international policy-making).
220. See generally Lash, supra note 89 (discussing generally how multinational agreements
change the nation states, but how they ultimately remain the most important political unit even in a
multinational world).
221. See Ruth Buchanan, Border Crossings: NAFTA, Regulatory Restructuring, and the Politics of
Place, 2 IND J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 371 (1995) (arguing that the NAFrA exacerbated differences
between localities, industries and labor markets and ignored the complex interaction of labor, capital
and regulation in the borderlands).
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financial services designed to lend stability to the world's financial
markets_

